From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail.toke.dk (mail.toke.dk [IPv6:2001:470:dc45:1000::1]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.bufferbloat.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E63253B2A4; Wed, 3 Oct 2018 16:12:52 -0400 (EDT) From: Toke =?utf-8?Q?H=C3=B8iland-J=C3=B8rgensen?= DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=toke.dk; s=20161023; t=1538597570; bh=h9jfNyPPaZOxsHRrJcAoc/lxVvcy+ZAik8hnqphhHRA=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:In-Reply-To:References:Date:From; b=xh99Fq47DKP125AkMUCb7RzO7P+KuQgLdex5vPWN11IiRjdvxYxkYUZZHzomOgR1i jSaGOL7nGdl7CUvKOBPak/HnOTRG8M+WZiMhphPjN7IIKHip+v+CzevriVN9SdualW JOFKEe7AsqkD7Appbk6DYlCfCrLpQ6pKbvs42uGsBclTcb3pLsHRJydWIKL3CGUow2 3MOhKNOjfbk40CRioGQqrSPOyQUTKmdToF51w3QpX7csCSCO8/aT4X2eRB8UViKN2q t1Y95xU3KTUtq8iRe2Vu9xThvqGCoT2pbSsViNhKMkc0N+/d3x8gzTlo3YCSNm6VxG YNfLWW6hAxf+g== To: Jonathan Morton Cc: Dave Taht , Mikael Abrahamsson , Cake List , cerowrt-devel@lists.bufferbloat.net In-Reply-To: <7DF1B2AE-37DD-4C08-A3A0-2890FAD0CE27@gmail.com> References: <1D2079D5-3BA8-4968-AD5A-990AFA3A7698@heistp.net> <87va6j9b97.fsf@toke.dk> <7DF1B2AE-37DD-4C08-A3A0-2890FAD0CE27@gmail.com> Date: Wed, 03 Oct 2018 22:12:50 +0200 X-Clacks-Overhead: GNU Terry Pratchett Message-ID: <87sh1maiwt.fsf@toke.dk> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Subject: Re: [Cake] [Cerowrt-devel] apu2 sqm/htb issue + a minor win for speeding up fq_codel itself X-BeenThere: cake@lists.bufferbloat.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.20 Precedence: list List-Id: Cake - FQ_codel the next generation List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 03 Oct 2018 20:12:53 -0000 Jonathan Morton writes: > I'm not familiar with precisely what mitigations are now in use on > ARM. I am however certain that, on a device running only trustworthy > code (ie. not running a Web browser), mitigating Spectre is > unnecessary. If an attacker gets into a position to exploit it, he's > already compromised the device enough to run a botnet anyway. Yup, especially on openwrt, where most daemons run as root anyway :) I would assume that something like the retpoline indirect function call protection is not actually enabled on openwrt; but since we were talking about performance regressions, that is certainly a major one... -Toke