Re: [Cerowrt-devel] Full blown DNSSEC by default?

[dpreed@reed.com]

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I'd be for A.  Or C with a very, very strong warning that would encourage users to pressure their broken upstream.  Users in China will never not have a broken upstream, of course, but they know that already... :-)
 
Similarly, I hope we don't have Heartbleed in our SSL.  Maybe we should put a probe in Cero's SSL that tests clients to see if they have Heartbleed fixed on their side, and warns them.
 
Any DNS provider that doesn't do DNSSEC should be deprecated strongly (I'm pretty sure OpenDNS cannot do so, since it deliberately fakes its lookups, redirecting to "man in the middle" sites that it runs).
 


On Sunday, April 13, 2014 12:26am, "Dave Taht" <dave.taht@gmail.com> said:



> I am delighted that we have the capability now to do dnssec.
> 
> I am not surprised that various domain name holders are doing it
> wrong, nor that some ISPs and registrars don't support doing it
> either. We are first past the post here, and kind of have to expect
> some bugs...
> 
> but is the overall sense here:
> 
> A) we should do full dnssec by default, and encourage users to use
> open dns resolvers like google dns that support it when their ISPs
> don't?
> 
> B) or should we fall back to the previous partial dnssec
> implementation that didn't break as hard, and encourage folk to turn
> it up full blast if supported correctly by the upstream ISP?
> 
> C) or come up with a way of detecting a broken upstream and falling
> back to a public open resolver?
> 
> Is there a "D"?
> 
> --
> Dave Täht
> 
> NSFW:
> https://w2.eff.org/Censorship/Internet_censorship_bills/russell_0296_indecent.article
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