Re: [Cerowrt-devel] Full blown DNSSEC by default?

["Török Edwin" <edwin+ml-cerowrt@etorok.net>]

On 04/13/2014 07:26 AM, Dave Taht wrote:
> I am delighted that we have the capability now to do dnssec.
> 
> I am not surprised that various domain name holders are doing it
> wrong, nor that some ISPs and registrars don't support doing it
> either. We are first past the post here, and kind of have to expect
> some bugs...
> 
> but is the overall sense here:
> 
> A) we should do full dnssec by default, and encourage users to use
> open dns resolvers like google dns that support it when their ISPs
> don't?

There are people who don't use Google DNS due to privacy concerns.
Given the choice between not using DNSSEC, and using Google's DNS they might prefer not having DNSSEC.

> 
> B) or should we fall back to the previous partial dnssec
> implementation that didn't break as hard, and encourage folk to turn
> it up full blast if supported correctly by the upstream ISP?
> 
> C) or come up with a way of detecting a broken upstream and falling
> back to a public open resolver?
> 
> Is there a "D"?

There are some tests described here, and a 'dynamic fallback' technique in section 5:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsop-dnssec-roadblock-avoidance-00

I think the 'dynamic fallback' can be described in short as: try to use upstream DNS resolver,
and if you don't get the DNSSEC metadata that you expected, *then* eventually fallback to iterating from Root for that metadata.
So then A/AAAA/TXT/NS/etc. records would be answered by upstream, and only for the DNSSEC metadata you would need to iterate
(and you could cache that, or stop iterating if you realize the zone is unsigned as per section 5.1.1)

Best regards,
--Edwin