Re: [Cerowrt-devel] DNSSEC & NTP Bootstrapping -- prototype!

["Toke Høiland-Jørgensen" <toke@toke.dk>]

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Dave Taht <dave.taht@gmail.com> writes:

> Well I strongly favor less interdependency between ntp, a monitoring
> script, and dnsmasq.

Well, the reverse dependency (i.e. the modification of the ntpd startup
script) is not strictly needed, so the dependency could be made to be
one-way (it kinda is already). Also, in case ntpd is missing it's quite
easy to just bail out and start dnsmasq in full validation mode.

The nice thing about this switch to dnsmasq is that it does validation
of the chain, just ignoring validity times; which presumably would make
it harder to exploit as you'd need an actual valid key, rather than just
be able to spoof the packets reply of the non-validated query...

> I'd kind of like some sort of check on validating the dns roots, if it
> fails due to the time being wrong, disable dnssec and wait for clock
> slew.

Well conceivably you could be in a situation where the roots validate,
but validation fails further down the chain, making that scheme fail in
weird and unpredictable ways?

> Another other alternative is a ntp that does a query with the
> authenticate bit off, all the time.

This would involve teaching the uclibc resolver about the CD bit and
expose it in the resolver API I think. Can look into how difficult this
actually is to do; with the caveat that I'm not exactly an expert on
such code :P

Also, see above re: validation modes.

> On Sat, Mar 29, 2014 at 2:21 PM, Michael Richardson <mcr@sandelman.ca> wrote:
>>
>> This process needs to be written up as an IETF BCP.

I'll be happy to write something up once we actually settle on something :)

-Toke

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