From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail.taht.net (mail.taht.net [176.58.107.8]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.bufferbloat.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 31BAB3B29E for ; Tue, 18 Sep 2018 13:30:09 -0400 (EDT) Received: from nemesis (unknown [172.58.38.172]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.taht.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 2D35E220ED for ; Tue, 18 Sep 2018 17:30:06 +0000 (UTC) From: Dave Taht To: cerowrt-devel@lists.bufferbloat.net Cc: References: <9f31e843-b8a2-5cbb-8fc8-94b35eb13061@thekelleys.org.uk> Date: Tue, 18 Sep 2018 10:30:03 -0700 In-Reply-To: <9f31e843-b8a2-5cbb-8fc8-94b35eb13061@thekelleys.org.uk> (Simon Kelley's message of "Sat, 8 Sep 2018 18:17:51 +0100") Message-ID: <87h8imsoh0.fsf@nemesis.taht.net> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/24.5 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Subject: Re: [Cerowrt-devel] [Dnsmasq-discuss] CERT Vulnerability VU#598349 X-BeenThere: cerowrt-devel@lists.bufferbloat.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.20 Precedence: list List-Id: Development issues regarding the cerowrt test router project List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 18 Sep 2018 17:30:09 -0000 As best as I recall, cerowrt enabled wpad for itself and thus was immune to this bug. Still... do upgrade off of cerowrt if you haven't already? Simon Kelley writes: > https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/598349 > > The essence of this is that an attacker can get a DHCP lease whilst > claiming the name "wpad" and thus insert the name wpad.example.com in > the local DNS pointing the attacker's machine. The presence of that A > record allows control of the proxy settings of any browser in the network. > > It's already possible to mitigate this: adding > > 0.0.0.0 wpad wpad.example.com > :: wpad.wpad.example.com > > to /etc/hosts will generate harmless A and AAAA records which override > those that may be created by DHCP leases. > > > The currently unreleased 2.80 version of dnsmasq adds the > dhcp-name-match option, which allows > > dhcp-name-match=set:wpad-ignore,wpad > dhcp-ignore-names=tag:wpad-ignore > > Which stops the attack at source. > > > The question is, should the above configuration be "baked in" to the code? > > > > Cheers, > > Simon. > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Dnsmasq-discuss mailing list > Dnsmasq-discuss@lists.thekelleys.org.uk > http://lists.thekelleys.org.uk/mailman/listinfo/dnsmasq-discuss