From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail2.tohojo.dk (mail2.tohojo.dk [IPv6:2a01:4f8:200:3141::101]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate) by huchra.bufferbloat.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DCFB821F182 for ; Sun, 13 Apr 2014 10:54:52 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at example.com Received: by alrua-x1.borgediget.toke.dk (Postfix, from userid 1000) id D7F441EACB; Sun, 13 Apr 2014 19:57:04 +0200 (CEST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=toke.dk; s=201310; t=1397411681; bh=DXuDQkwEvpenymBbFbEkZy+TGiwX4OLo4qbB8fWPaxI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:References:Date:In-Reply-To; b=jmbm0fE07GQ5+D23mUw2fAjwvjFoGGDRGupFOFCHN/brPYYXnJZhNEblpAaOXA5j8 rWNABJtq31k5MknhqHI2/TLUo8bATvxXO1Vvv28QH0l+C+W4CL8uEwydzkd47ZuJd2 Uv5VizEUzfw8iiTw4r8sYs9Xg8/Qnt6fsAppbY0M= From: =?utf-8?Q?Toke_H=C3=B8iland-J=C3=B8rgensen?= To: Dave Taht References: <1397405772.54075631@apps.rackspace.com> Date: Sun, 13 Apr 2014 19:57:01 +0200 In-Reply-To: (Dave Taht's message of "Sun, 13 Apr 2014 09:40:55 -0700") Message-ID: <87siph6rki.fsf@toke.dk> Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="=-=-="; micalg=pgp-sha256; protocol="application/pgp-signature" Cc: "cerowrt-devel@lists.bufferbloat.net" Subject: Re: [Cerowrt-devel] Full blown DNSSEC by default? X-BeenThere: cerowrt-devel@lists.bufferbloat.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.13 Precedence: list List-Id: Development issues regarding the cerowrt test router project List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 13 Apr 2014 17:54:53 -0000 --=-=-= Content-Type: text/plain Dave Taht writes: > Boingo has sent out a mail to all customers saying they were not > affected, but I do worry a lot about the overall security of > enterprise wifi and 802.1x ethernet networks in general. FWIW the 802.1x authentication usually works in one of two modes: MSCHAPv2 which is Microsoft's challenge/response protocol that never ships passwords over the wire (setups that authenticate against an Active Directory, or people who want to support windows clients natively will run in this mode), or EAP-TTLS which has a second end-to-end TLS tunnel from the wireless client all the way back to the authentication server. Presumably the latter will also be vulnerable to heartbleed until updated, but at least there's another layer of turtles there. -Toke --=-=-= Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJTSs/tAAoJEENeEGz1+utP5zsH/0YUBWCoFMlTXzUT8WmwmY5a 1Wb+1bye6osulCIUrtqwFnt/U0faVQN66Pbn6u5excdYfiCcnIyANq5YREul65zR n2NTgSU38IbwvxQlYothmH15Y6iYWG0M/y2RLoBHf2noxZCyuV3Em6CULNlre7jZ ymEmQ1XZrv+rXNHaa2uIY8Zh+DwwlqaM+4QqrXmym7nbCDO2JLUqggm2voe1tDnH ooSTMkvUfvBXzxwlrWjPybb52ZA06ELsVXWOv6m7Ng+9QQDFbYpGubCNYVCWxUKg OcIQPe1Q0YXggAVBv4I7lzIfsytewqGIjEDZW+aNVpz3Ax4gs7QyIeVG96+LopQ= =JzO+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --=-=-=--