From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail-we0-x231.google.com (mail-we0-x231.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:400c:c03::231]) (using TLSv1 with cipher RC4-SHA (128/128 bits)) (Client CN "smtp.gmail.com", Issuer "Google Internet Authority G2" (verified OK)) by huchra.bufferbloat.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 194DC21F19B for ; Sun, 13 Apr 2014 09:40:57 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-we0-f177.google.com with SMTP id u57so6961954wes.8 for ; Sun, 13 Apr 2014 09:40:56 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type:content-transfer-encoding; bh=OKWVDUaIsPEXpk6ylYbJwENICLGAo1hzgVMLg1Swj2k=; b=D68I6coj3fjj/UlkCjVCMQnL1uq3sNzNo/a8LJOaEw2DrZ6VNsX2w6TWuSuB4e6LfJ 4wXzWTPDjr/ixj+lnONKstmJi+64hODhU4ixDY4xI9uvgjKwVsnr0BthzhWZjPvQWDSu kZRNYZ/MhZqhr+qAhwI35rPmfsBtk/9MUAGooqXrO2Pm4Vn/CKWtITZpEDWAvAb46dN8 w7PCAGRHkE9ZrxM6CoG+j5KNrugAWxTmcasvFs0fiuJEYJGKSZ7WaujN3l8Q9pTbquTo r5HlDwW5Qyqa1no3e2dkiXlc3+mXS/OO797uhTkKPEbvJU3BIdSKQv5IxLjhvUjtkcVc Jtpg== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.180.78.225 with SMTP id e1mr6303596wix.17.1397407256006; Sun, 13 Apr 2014 09:40:56 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.216.177.10 with HTTP; Sun, 13 Apr 2014 09:40:55 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <1397405772.54075631@apps.rackspace.com> References: <1397405772.54075631@apps.rackspace.com> Date: Sun, 13 Apr 2014 09:40:55 -0700 Message-ID: From: Dave Taht To: David Reed Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Cc: "cerowrt-devel@lists.bufferbloat.net" Subject: Re: [Cerowrt-devel] Full blown DNSSEC by default? X-BeenThere: cerowrt-devel@lists.bufferbloat.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.13 Precedence: list List-Id: Development issues regarding the cerowrt test router project List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 13 Apr 2014 16:40:58 -0000 On Sun, Apr 13, 2014 at 9:16 AM, wrote: > I'd be for A. Or C with a very, very strong warning that would encourage > users to pressure their broken upstream. Users in China will never not h= ave > a broken upstream, of course, but they know that already... :-) I'd be very much for A except that I'd like somehow a failure to resolve due to a dnssec problem to return a pointer to something, somehow that informs the user as to what went wrong and what to do about it. > Similarly, I hope we don't have Heartbleed in our SSL. All versions of cerowrt prior to 3.10.36-3 potentially had heartbleed in the https admin interface, and also possibly hostapd (though I don't know how to exploit it). The optional wpa_supplicant, openvpn, strongswan, authsae packages also were affected and a few others I forget. More scarily - from a large deployment perspective, things like the radsec radius backend also use TLS security to carry authentication info back to a radius server. All of openwrt, dd-wrt, etc from Attitude Adjustment to trunk to about 12 hours after the disclosure were vulnerable. Patches went into the relevant repositories but it's going to be very hard to push updates out to the field, since no update mechanism exists for most embedded products. Boingo has sent out a mail to all customers saying they were not affected, but I do worry a lot about the overall security of enterprise wifi and 802.1x ethernet networks in general. > Maybe we should put > a probe in Cero's SSL that tests clients to see if they have Heartbleed > fixed on their side, and warns them. I'd like more probes and defenses in general, notably things that detect dns amplification attempts and send them somewhere to be collected, some sort of universal moon worm attempt detector/reporter, and the equivalent of a rbl database for attacks and potential attackers. > Any DNS provider that doesn't do DNSSEC should be deprecated strongly (I'= m > pretty sure OpenDNS cannot do so, since it deliberately fakes its lookups= , > redirecting to "man in the middle" sites that it runs). Concur. On the one hand I was happy with the idea of dnscrypt, but not happy that the backend couldn't do dnssec right. > On Sunday, April 13, 2014 12:26am, "Dave Taht" said= : > >> I am delighted that we have the capability now to do dnssec. >> >> I am not surprised that various domain name holders are doing it >> wrong, nor that some ISPs and registrars don't support doing it >> either. We are first past the post here, and kind of have to expect >> some bugs... >> >> but is the overall sense here: >> >> A) we should do full dnssec by default, and encourage users to use >> open dns resolvers like google dns that support it when their ISPs >> don't? >> >> B) or should we fall back to the previous partial dnssec >> implementation that didn't break as hard, and encourage folk to turn >> it up full blast if supported correctly by the upstream ISP? >> >> C) or come up with a way of detecting a broken upstream and falling >> back to a public open resolver? >> >> Is there a "D"? >> >> -- >> Dave T=E4ht >> >> NSFW: >> >> https://w2.eff.org/Censorship/Internet_censorship_bills/russell_0296_ind= ecent.article >> _______________________________________________ >> Cerowrt-devel mailing list >> Cerowrt-devel@lists.bufferbloat.net >> https://lists.bufferbloat.net/listinfo/cerowrt-devel >> --=20 Dave T=E4ht NSFW: https://w2.eff.org/Censorship/Internet_censorship_bills/russell_0296_= indecent.article