From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail2.tohojo.dk (mail2.tohojo.dk [77.235.48.147]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.bufferbloat.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B6A903B29F; Sat, 1 Oct 2016 11:51:33 -0400 (EDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at mail2.tohojo.dk DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.10.3 mail2.tohojo.dk 566E541622 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=toke.dk; s=201310; t=1475337091; bh=TOTT3sO/yKVbsbB3zSCc1gXXZ42Ynf7FE7Qz+++O/w4=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:References:Date:In-Reply-To:From; b=amoVmlOqnSBOvmF+l46rdM6M3Rl8E5px/WXWHpgYZfGGiir/ECTiceFpJv6AhMGIp u2Oc4dmGJ8S6BqSPtzx9aomO9k44MTYOAdlY/f2jq6qJwntFGCodEeTMQFnc6cP3AJ q4RHTz32GbSH8TprtBAM1m9sTALl4QCAba4SjlI0= Sender: toke@toke.dk Received: by alrua-karlstad.karlstad.toke.dk (Postfix, from userid 1000) id 21AF6873A05; Sat, 1 Oct 2016 17:51:30 +0200 (CEST) From: =?utf-8?Q?Toke_H=C3=B8iland-J=C3=B8rgensen?= To: Dave Taht Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" , cake@lists.bufferbloat.net, make-wifi-fast@lists.bufferbloat.net, WireGuard mailing list References: <87twcw9tih.fsf@toke.dk> Date: Sat, 01 Oct 2016 17:51:30 +0200 In-Reply-To: (Dave Taht's message of "Sat, 1 Oct 2016 08:40:59 -0700") X-Clacks-Overhead: GNU Terry Pratchett Message-ID: <87ponk9if1.fsf@toke.dk> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Subject: Re: [Make-wifi-fast] [Cake] WireGuard Queuing, Bufferbloat, Performance, Latency, and related issues X-BeenThere: make-wifi-fast@lists.bufferbloat.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.20 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 01 Oct 2016 15:51:33 -0000 Dave Taht writes: > My thought - given that at least on some platforms - encrypting 1000 > packets at a time is a bad idea - would be something regulating the > amount of data being crypted at a time, an equivalent to byte queue > limits - BQL - BCL? byte crypto limits - to keep no more than, say, > 1ms of data in that part of the subsystem. Well, the dynamic queue limit stuff is reusable (in include/linux/dynamic_queue_limits.h). The netdev BQL stuff just uses these functions with the packet byte sizes; so adapting it to use in wireguard should be fairly straight forward :) > ... also pulling stuff out of order from an already encrypted thing > leads to the same IV problems we had in mac80211. Yeah, but who needs IVs, really? ;) -Toke