From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from bifrost.lang.hm (lang.hm [66.167.227.134]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.bufferbloat.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B15F93BA8E for ; Mon, 9 Jul 2018 01:13:27 -0400 (EDT) Received: from dlang-laptop ([10.2.0.162]) by bifrost.lang.hm (8.13.4/8.13.4/Debian-3) with ESMTP id w695DMMl024806; Sun, 8 Jul 2018 22:13:23 -0700 Date: Sun, 8 Jul 2018 22:13:22 -0700 (PDT) From: David Lang X-X-Sender: dlang@dlang-laptop To: Pete Heist cc: bkil , Make-Wifi-fast In-Reply-To: <2EC1279B-76C6-48C0-AED4-E9C4A7D0F004@heistp.net> Message-ID: References: <9E7E043B-2373-46ED-B122-38A287422999@eventide.io> <87d0wu7rbg.fsf@toke.dk> <8A44F1D4-1EB8-4D46-85F9-00C7307FF2D4@heistp.net> <2EC1279B-76C6-48C0-AED4-E9C4A7D0F004@heistp.net> User-Agent: Alpine 2.21.1 (DEB 209 2017-03-23) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="8323328-751252626-1531113203=:10894" Subject: Re: [Make-wifi-fast] mesh deployment with ath9k driver changes X-BeenThere: make-wifi-fast@lists.bufferbloat.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.20 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 09 Jul 2018 05:13:27 -0000 This message is in MIME format. The first part should be readable text, while the remaining parts are likely unreadable without MIME-aware tools. --8323328-751252626-1531113203=:10894 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8BIT On Wed, 4 Jul 2018, Pete Heist wrote: > >> N.b.: It's a pity that networking trace anonymization tools aren't up >> to the challenge. Simple MAC randomization or hashing with data >> omission would be just fine for such a use case. > > I’m also surprised I don’t see an obvious tool to randomize MACs. In the case of releasing captures of guest traffic without asking their permission though, I’m not sure any technical measures would be enough to erase the perception problem, but pseudonymization of all possible identifying values would theoretically satisfy GDPR requirements, for example. After that, it would be extremely difficult (maybe not impossible) without extensive external knowledge to identify users from their traffic. When I look at the data from SCaLE, I find that if I truncate the MAC addresses by one byte, there are still very few collisions. In your much more limited situation, I'll bet that you can get away with dropping everything except the last couple of bytes and have the traces be usable. --8323328-751252626-1531113203=:10894--