From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail-ed1-x531.google.com (mail-ed1-x531.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::531]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.bufferbloat.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B65863B2A4 for ; Thu, 9 Nov 2023 11:48:29 -0500 (EST) Received: by mail-ed1-x531.google.com with SMTP id 4fb4d7f45d1cf-543923af573so1796256a12.0 for ; Thu, 09 Nov 2023 08:48:29 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20230601; t=1699548508; x=1700153308; darn=lists.bufferbloat.net; h=cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=vrg/E1QL+PD8Iim5blH5QtsE3kbJoQJqZxIJYb7vfjw=; b=ClGWtnujPBFum3rY1oVwDOU15NrTKx0IlKeC7k7R4tO+NAfcrPMPTczfHhhnc1iv6y 6SpFMFnuyWWzaHfGddUgOO5+OVwysJ5R3xthdNEZ8IJKnVNxU2YRRv9391MntRYuIoBf zEidyWppC8MhZ71M1qHo1MhzzsuBY8zE34kZBTupKm9zMxqJYVV2JuLH4H/28P+LVaHJ 2q9rDhN7iVe6S4YVdNR9ZCBU1SEKm+WaxkSGf4zwo92R8UnzhQb2JRQdz7ONYckq/8A0 9yH2HvMch2c77984w8J0RSmf2WPBelr/TdiFXic7K4ueZDhvUo8c9qgRKTkSAq6kHDAN F+1w== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20230601; t=1699548508; x=1700153308; h=cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id :reply-to; bh=vrg/E1QL+PD8Iim5blH5QtsE3kbJoQJqZxIJYb7vfjw=; b=uYVOHbEy+iYidxSupafXxgV09KDbP0DbvSZAoQ4gwcuvqFDp8Din/r0URl4rjZ9Aiw 1/6qDriC7MzM8CvzuQgTQ//Q1S9AZ55j2y2jP7+cXXiM7OTnCyYx6ns5jGLut/c+i9MM YqNiGq2dP9DdWedo7M3wWyxVtOZnjwB79AEzBGupWWpl9Vm/LCMUkKBC+u7ueXuC/H6D Rn7dY3aYiug2PZhmgOdUDr20OjlLqjag3IW82ZHXK5QCoU8khNCXewmTQ4yLmpFwMfG5 E2A8HDNxsDNSKtL0AR3HUAt+x0YO0eHDvmDZVmyV6fOC0mDzpmQ6x3ngxUTNBZNW9Yms vBdw== X-Gm-Message-State: AOJu0YzBJ5bzcB5pH6Id/4FKv+CUHa85xe7oVbLMp08kBjs1SEs5aVah fjMHxAbb3vvV7tjn3PDkRUfDIE5ZffDokme/tWaXSaSvNzY= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGHT+IGoXzjDWgESQ2fcWCXz7gCkvbHTqnDi8S8ULs2obVSCW2lcHlGQDR/YHR6H5AQkuhGSOiEKDciV+LEGOFomaro= X-Received: by 2002:a17:907:7d9e:b0:9be:ca44:87b6 with SMTP id oz30-20020a1709077d9e00b009beca4487b6mr4874938ejc.3.1699548508012; Thu, 09 Nov 2023 08:48:28 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: In-Reply-To: From: "David Bray, PhD" Date: Thu, 9 Nov 2023 11:47:46 -0500 Message-ID: To: =?UTF-8?Q?Network_Neutrality_is_back=21_Let=C2=B4s_make_the_technical_asp?= =?UTF-8?Q?ects_heard_this_time=21?= Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="0000000000001943940609baf9c0" Subject: Re: [NNagain] cybersecurity is not a talent problem X-BeenThere: nnagain@lists.bufferbloat.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.20 Precedence: list List-Id: =?utf-8?q?Network_Neutrality_is_back!_Let=C2=B4s_make_the_technical_aspects_heard_this_time!?= List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 09 Nov 2023 16:48:29 -0000 --0000000000001943940609baf9c0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable I'd submit we also need more cyber talent - staffing Congress (or elected to Congress). And we need more cyber talent rotating in and out of NIST - the National Institutes of Standards and Technology. The reason why are three-fold: 1.) It's easy for Congress to position themselves as outraged and concerned if/when something goes wrong (and things will go wrong - in the case of OPM it was valuable information being targeted by what appears to have been PRC for potentially intel-related purposes) - however Congress has both the authorization and appropriations function. Which means they can authorize (and thus request) agencies to do 100+ things and appropriate funds to do only 25 of them. Remember that the OPM breach happened around the time that government had experienced the "do more with less" rubric and so sure there are plenty of more things they could have done - the question that you never see an IG nor a Congressional heading ask, was whether the agency had been given enough money to do all those things by their Congressional committees? 2.) NIST usually puts out great audience on all the things that need to be done to secure systems. However they're usually again missing the realpolitik of 100+ priorities and only funds for 25+ of them. Auditing firms, who usually do the work of IGs (they contract out to them) love NIST checklists as they can take anywhere between 8-10 months to do, tying up the cybersecurity and other IT Team resources of an agency's team to answer all the questions and reviews. Then the findings are shared - and you can be sure there's always "more needed here" because the auditing firm wants to come back next year and the IG exists to find things wrong - and usually the agency's management team has 2-4 months to mitigate whatever was found before the process will continue again next year. When we're spending more time auditing vs. fixing the things the audit found, I don't think that's a recipe for "winning"? 3.) So how do we fix this? * Rotate people from operational agencies to NIST to balance the "if you had perfect time, perfect budgets, and no other priorities" with the realpolitik of none of those things are true. Also tie this to a mechanism to link any IG findings of serious issues needing to be fix to an immediate presentation by the IG themselves to the Congress on why Congress should authorize and appropriate funds *now* to fix the issue asap. Yes, ask the IG to do this - not the poor management team who has to get dinged by the IG and then go to Congress and ask for funds to fix the issue - only to be told either not now or sure, however you still have to do these 25+ other things with the same budget we already gave you. * Rotate cyber talent between Congress and the Executive Branch too. This way Congress can learn what it's really like in the Executive Branch + the Exec Branch can appreciate the priorities of Congress (to include Congress exists to get re-elected). Also fix the fact that while there's plenty of "Oversight" committees for bad things, the other part of Congress - namely Ways and Means - does not have a forum for when things go well. It's almost like Congress is perfectly designed to focus on all the bad things that go wrong in the Executive Branch but lack any mechanisms to celebrate and spotlight goodness in the Executive Branch. And so this creates the dysfunctions - and bad perceptions - we see today. * Find ways to do cybersecurity reviews that aren't checklists. The checklists continue to grow - while NIST tries to do its best - things get more and more voluminous each year and we're now at 8-10 months for an audit which leaves precious little time for remediation and fixes. Require any annual audit done by an IG and third-party firm to not consume more than 1/3rd of the year to leave 2/3rd of the year for fixes before it's repeated again. Also deconflict the new executive order on Artificial Intelligence which (at 110+ pages) adds tons of new responsibilities and checklists to executive branch agencies - with **no** additional funding for this and **no** deconfliction of the existing FISMA, FITARA, and other annual IT audits government agencies have to do. Hope this helps. On Thu, Nov 9, 2023 at 4:19=E2=80=AFAM David Lang via Nnagain < nnagain@lists.bufferbloat.net> wrote: > Most of the places that I've worked, the security team have had no proble= m > identifying problems that need to be fixed faster than the rest of the > company > can fix them. > > At a few places, the Security team has been responsible for enough > infrastructure that they struggle to fix things as well, but not many > places. > > So more manpower is needed, but not necessarily where you expect it. > > David Lang > > On Wed, 8 Nov 2023, Lee via Nnagain wrote: > > > Date: Wed, 8 Nov 2023 21:26:27 -0500 > > From: Lee via Nnagain > > To: dickroy@alum.mit.edu, > > Network Neutrality is back! Let=C2=B4s make the technical aspects h= eard > this > > time! > > Cc: Lee > > Subject: Re: [NNagain] cybersecurity is not a talent problem > > > > On Wed, Nov 8, 2023 at 7:58=E2=80=AFPM Dick Roy via Nnagain wrote: > >> > >> Yes, today one can argue that there is a shortage of talent, however > Paul's point was that that I s not the first problem to solve, in fact th= e > problem that must be solved first is: > >> > >> " We're in a hole, here, folks. The first thing we should do is: stop > digging.=E2=80=9D > >> > >> ... and he is right IMHO! > > > > If Katherine Archuleta had enough talent to heed the warnings from the > > IG there's a chance there wouldn't have been a breach. The > > organization should have been well past the "stop digging" phase when > > the breach occurred. > > > >> > https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/lack-talent-problem-cyber-paul-vixie/ > >> > Nothing that happened at OPM, or failed to happen at OPM, was the > fault of its leadership team. > > > > Wrong. At the very least, management should have been closing the > > holes that had been identified. > > > > again, looking at > > > https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/The-OPM-Data-Breac= h-How-the-Government-Jeopardized-Our-National-Security-for-More-than-a-Gene= ration.pdf > > on page 6 > > > > How the Breach Happened. Despite this high value information > > maintained by OPM, the agency failed to prioritize cybersecurity and > > adequately secure high value data. The OPM Inspector General (IG) > > warned since at least 2005 that the information maintained by OPM was > > vulnerable to hackers. > > > > The leadership team ***was warned***. Given that they "failed to ... > > adequately secure high value data", how is whatever did or didn't > > happen at OPM _NOT_ the fault of the leadership team? > > > > I'll agree that > >> > Katherine Archuleta should not have had to ... be an expert on > "cyber" security > > > > But she _did_ need to listen to the experts that were warning her > > about how bad security was. And she needed enough talent to realize > > that she should heed the warnings from her cyber security experts. > > > >> and also because she had a reasonable expectation that somebody, > somewhere, knew how completely and ruinously bad all of the IT (Informati= on > Technology) in the world was, and would have told her that there was no > safety anywhere except on paper, in filing cabinets, guarded by the U.S. > Military. > > > > Seriously? There is no absolute security so no matter how much > > leadership ignores warnings, or how bad the security is in the > > organization they're running, it's not their fault when a security > > breach happens? > > Do you really buy that? Would you be OK with your bank or any other > > organization that has your PII thinking like that? > > > > speaking of which.. How do you feel about Equifax? Oh well.. nothing > > that could have been done, they should have been put out of business > > or something in between? > > > > Regards, > > Lee > > > > > > > >> > >> RR > >> > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: Nnagain [mailto:nnagain-bounces@lists.bufferbloat.net] On Behalf > Of Lee via Nnagain > >> Sent: Wednesday, November 8, 2023 2:47 PM > >> To: Network Neutrality is back! Let=C2=B4s make the technical aspects = heard > this time! > >> Cc: Lee > >> Subject: Re: [NNagain] cybersecurity is not a talent problem > >> > >> On Wed, Nov 8, 2023 at 2:22=E2=80=AFPM Dave Taht via Nnagain wrote: > >> > > >> > Paul Vixie reposted this old piece of his, even more relevant today, > than 2015. > >> > > >> > https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/lack-talent-problem-cyber-paul-vixie/ > >> > >> I disagree. With a lot, but let's just go with this > >> > The "cyber" security problems that the US Government, and every othe= r > government, and every large and medium enterprise are all coping with tod= ay > do not stem from lack of "cyber" talent. > >> > >> Take a look at > >> > https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/The-OPM-Data-Breac= h-How-the-Government-Jeopardized-Our-National-Security-for-More-than-a-Gene= ration.pdf > >> > >> on page 9: > >> The bottom line. The longstanding failure of OPM's leadership to > >> implement basic cyber > >> hugiene, such as maintaining current authorities to operate and > >> employing strong multi-factor > >> authentication, despite years of warnings from the Inspector General, > >> represents a failure of > >> culture and leadershit, not technology. > >> > >> There is no substitute for talent. > >> > >> Regards, > >> Lee > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Nnagain mailing list > >> Nnagain@lists.bufferbloat.net > >> https://lists.bufferbloat.net/listinfo/nnagain > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Nnagain mailing list > >> Nnagain@lists.bufferbloat.net > >> https://lists.bufferbloat.net/listinfo/nnagain > > _______________________________________________ > > Nnagain mailing list > > Nnagain@lists.bufferbloat.net > > https://lists.bufferbloat.net/listinfo/nnagain > _______________________________________________ > Nnagain mailing list > Nnagain@lists.bufferbloat.net > https://lists.bufferbloat.net/listinfo/nnagain > --0000000000001943940609baf9c0 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I'd submit we also need more cyber talent - staff= ing Congress (or elected to Congress).

And we= need more cyber talent rotating in and out of NIST - the National Institut= es of Standards and Technology.

The reason wh= y are three-fold:

1.) It's easy for Congr= ess to position themselves as outraged and concerned if/when something goes= wrong (and things will go wrong - in the case of OPM it was valuable infor= mation being targeted by what appears to have been PRC for potentially inte= l-related purposes) - however Congress has both the authorization and appro= priations function. Which means they can authorize (and thus request) agenc= ies to do 100+ things and appropriate funds to do only 25 of them. Remember= that the OPM breach happened around the time that government had experienc= ed the "do more with less" rubric and so sure there are plenty of= more things they could have done - the question that you never see an IG n= or a Congressional heading ask, was whether the agency had been given enoug= h money to do all those things by their Congressional committees?=C2=A0

2.) NIST usually puts out great audience on all the t= hings that need to be done to secure systems. However they're usually a= gain missing the realpolitik of 100+ priorities and only funds for 25+ of t= hem. Auditing firms, who usually do the work of IGs (they contract out to t= hem) love NIST checklists as they can take anywhere between 8-10 months to = do, tying up the cybersecurity and other IT Team resources of an agency'= ;s team to answer all the questions and reviews. Then the findings are shar= ed - and you can be sure there's always "more needed here" be= cause the auditing firm wants to come back next year and the IG exists to f= ind things wrong - and usually the agency's management team has 2-4 mon= ths to mitigate whatever was found before the process will continue again n= ext year. When we're spending more time auditing vs. fixing the things = the audit found, I don't think that's a recipe for "winning&qu= ot;?=C2=A0

3.) So how do we fix this?=C2=A0
<= div>
* Rotate people from operational agencies to NIST to bal= ance the "if you had perfect time, perfect budgets, and no other prior= ities" with the realpolitik of none of those things are true. Also tie= this to a mechanism to link any IG findings of serious issues needing to b= e fix to an immediate presentation by the IG themselves to the Congress on = why Congress should authorize and appropriate funds *now* to fix the issue = asap. Yes, ask the IG to do this - not the poor management team who has to = get dinged by the IG and then go to Congress and ask for funds to fix the i= ssue - only to be told either not now or sure, however you still have to do= these 25+ other things with the same budget we already gave you.=C2=A0

* Rotate cyber talent between Congress and the Execut= ive Branch too. This way Congress can learn what it's really like in th= e Executive Branch=C2=A0+ the Exec Branch can appreciate the priorities of = Congress (to include Congress exists to get re-elected). Also fix the fact = that while there's plenty of "Oversight" committees for bad t= hings, the other part of Congress - namely Ways and Means - does not have a= forum for when things go well. It's almost like Congress is perfectly = designed to focus on all the bad things that go wrong in the Executive Bran= ch but lack any mechanisms to celebrate and spotlight goodness in the Execu= tive Branch. And so this creates the dysfunctions - and bad perceptions - w= e see today.

* Find ways to do cybersecurity = reviews that aren't checklists. The checklists continue to grow - while= NIST tries to do its best - things get more and more voluminous each year = and we're now at 8-10 months for an audit which leaves precious little = time for remediation and fixes. Require any annual audit done by an IG and = third-party firm to not consume more than 1/3rd of the year to leave 2/3rd = of the year for fixes before it's repeated again. Also deconflict the n= ew executive order on Artificial Intelligence which (at 110+ pages) adds to= ns of new responsibilities and checklists to executive branch agencies - wi= th **no** additional funding for this and **no** deconfliction of the exist= ing FISMA, FITARA, and other annual IT audits government agencies have to d= o.

Hope this helps.

=
=C2=A0

On Thu, Nov 9, 2023 at 4:19=E2=80=AFAM David Lang via = Nnagain <nnagain@lists.bufferbloat.net> wrote:
Most of the places that I've worked, t= he security team have had no problem
identifying problems that need to be fixed faster than the rest of the comp= any
can fix them.

At a few places, the Security team has been responsible for enough
infrastructure that they struggle to fix things as well, but not many place= s.

So more manpower is needed, but not necessarily where you expect it.

David Lang

On Wed, 8 Nov 2023, Lee via Nnagain wrote:

> Date: Wed, 8 Nov 2023 21:26:27 -0500
> From: Lee via Nnagain <nnagain@lists.bufferbloat.net>
> To: dickroy@= alum.mit.edu,
>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Network Neutrality is back! Let=C2=B4s make the tec= hnical aspects heard this
>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0time! <nnagain@lists.bufferbloat.net>
> Cc: Lee <ler7= 62@gmail.com>
> Subject: Re: [NNagain] cybersecurity is not a talent problem
>
> On Wed, Nov 8, 2023 at 7:58=E2=80=AFPM Dick Roy via Nnagain wrote:
>>
>> Yes, today one can argue that there is a shortage of talent, howev= er Paul's point was that that I s not the first problem to solve, in fa= ct the problem that must be solved first is:
>>
>> " We're in a hole, here, folks. The first thing we should= do is: stop digging.=E2=80=9D
>>
>> ... and he is right IMHO!
>
> If Katherine Archuleta had enough talent to heed the warnings from the=
> IG there's a chance there wouldn't have been a breach.=C2=A0 T= he
> organization should have been well past the "stop digging" p= hase when
> the breach occurred.
>
>> > https://www.linked= in.com/pulse/lack-talent-problem-cyber-paul-vixie/
>> > Nothing that happened at OPM, or failed to happen at OPM, was= the fault of its leadership team.
>
> Wrong.=C2=A0 At the very least, management should have been closing th= e
> holes that had been identified.
>
> again, looking at
>=C2=A0 https:= //oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/The-OPM-Data-Breach-How-th= e-Government-Jeopardized-Our-National-Security-for-More-than-a-Generation.p= df
> on page 6
>
>=C2=A0 How the Breach Happened.=C2=A0 Despite this high value informati= on
> maintained by OPM, the agency failed to prioritize cybersecurity and > adequately secure high value data.=C2=A0 The OPM Inspector General (IG= )
> warned since at least 2005 that the information maintained by OPM was<= br> > vulnerable to hackers.
>
> The leadership team ***was warned***.=C2=A0 Given that they "fail= ed to ...
> adequately secure high value data", how is whatever did or didn&#= 39;t
> happen at OPM _NOT_ the fault of the leadership team?
>
> I'll agree that
>> > Katherine Archuleta should not have had to ... be an expert o= n "cyber" security
>
> But she _did_ need to listen to the experts that were warning her
> about how bad security was.=C2=A0 And she needed enough talent to real= ize
> that she should heed the warnings from her cyber security experts.
>
>> and also because she had a reasonable expectation that somebody, s= omewhere, knew how completely and ruinously bad all of the IT (Information = Technology) in the world was, and would have told her that there was no saf= ety anywhere except on paper, in filing cabinets, guarded by the U.S. Milit= ary.
>
> Seriously?=C2=A0 There is no absolute security so no matter how much > leadership ignores warnings, or how bad the security is in the
> organization they're running, it's not their fault when a secu= rity
> breach happens?
> Do you really buy that?=C2=A0 Would you be OK with your bank or any ot= her
> organization that has your PII thinking like that?
>
> speaking of which.. How do you feel about Equifax?=C2=A0 Oh well.. not= hing
> that could have been done, they should have been put out of business > or something in between?
>
> Regards,
> Lee
>
>
>
>>
>> RR
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Nnagain [mailto:nnagain-bounces@lists.bufferbloat.net] O= n Behalf Of Lee via Nnagain
>> Sent: Wednesday, November 8, 2023 2:47 PM
>> To: Network Neutrality is back! Let=C2=B4s make the technical aspe= cts heard this time!
>> Cc: Lee
>> Subject: Re: [NNagain] cybersecurity is not a talent problem
>>
>> On Wed, Nov 8, 2023 at 2:22=E2=80=AFPM Dave Taht via Nnagain wrote= :
>> >
>> > Paul Vixie reposted this old piece of his, even more relevant= today, than 2015.
>> >
>> > https://www.linked= in.com/pulse/lack-talent-problem-cyber-paul-vixie/
>>
>> I disagree.=C2=A0 With a lot, but let's just go with this
>> > The "cyber" security problems that the US Governmen= t, and every other government, and every large and medium enterprise are al= l coping with today do not stem from lack of "cyber" talent.
>>
>> Take a look at
>>=C2=A0 =C2=A0https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/The-OPM-Data-Bre= ach-How-the-Government-Jeopardized-Our-National-Security-for-More-than-a-Ge= neration.pdf
>>
>> on page 9:
>>=C2=A0 =C2=A0The bottom line.=C2=A0 The longstanding failure of OPM= 's leadership to
>> implement basic cyber
>> hugiene, such as maintaining current authorities to operate and >> employing strong multi-factor
>> authentication,=C2=A0 despite years of warnings from the Inspector= General,
>> represents a failure of
>> culture and leadershit, not technology.
>>
>> There is no substitute for talent.
>>
>> Regards,
>> Lee
>> _______________________________________________
>> Nnagain mailing list
>> Nnagain@lists.bufferbloat.net
>> https://lists.bufferbloat.net/listinfo/nnagai= n
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Nnagain mailing list
>> Nnagain@lists.bufferbloat.net
>> https://lists.bufferbloat.net/listinfo/nnagai= n
> _______________________________________________
> Nnagain mailing list
> Nna= gain@lists.bufferbloat.net
> https://lists.bufferbloat.net/listinfo/nnagain_______________________________________________
Nnagain mailing list
Nnagain@= lists.bufferbloat.net
https://lists.bufferbloat.net/listinfo/nnagain
--0000000000001943940609baf9c0--