From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail-ej1-x629.google.com (mail-ej1-x629.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::629]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.bufferbloat.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D95DD3B2A4 for ; Thu, 13 Mar 2025 21:38:48 -0400 (EDT) Received: by mail-ej1-x629.google.com with SMTP id a640c23a62f3a-ac2a81e41e3so348099266b.1 for ; Thu, 13 Mar 2025 18:38:48 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20230601; t=1741916327; x=1742521127; darn=lists.bufferbloat.net; h=cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=SWvvcGXYX0+1eTZFxQ7kTLDdjnh4DFpQS1UzOblvoJQ=; b=D5+FHlD/M3NI8EqftVzJtkdM2tr4WPY7DZRufp+DoOKDVB245Rw64EWYDDvrAyGlyj KVACLqs9Piy3E/WGHWJlcPpfLxnzEfk1OQfZYmi5UF9BpchOEBk3FMzFvFMqcvyUPza5 bG/KaD08IIsKes51EwLT5hoEBBsbonsAdezzVsA8C2BMMAz/1KNIaOZOJ5RoFIx9TaMp e+zTwBmpIRvhrqWWwlIU89T/sL+fK3epfqrfYLObtdx1Z4Tu9wQm2UMKaC6IkwAAWwxF 4zbmbhkfhb85XULCiwEW4ISReUNdb/stgvzkQQ/DTPfEziScbNF6GfsL6Ium8b9miO/5 svEw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20230601; t=1741916327; x=1742521127; h=cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id :reply-to; bh=SWvvcGXYX0+1eTZFxQ7kTLDdjnh4DFpQS1UzOblvoJQ=; b=RmOeW/UPAJLrIkKjvY0HyltGKCmmqGjKtdVQtdep/DC3/ORbLergi7pRy93JHBVtUC rd9gW5T6VeuhICu38YbQrdtiLf98l5nMu39NiS7kcQAtAMdkSajJMqSWs7bYlMk5j6Ag TCrPymur26obFgCms3JdaR+kNG9sz8VuTUzi/sGERc/NC40dxxGVY/jfe3tXNGhsjMx0 L+UZosCstRjWUhc3vPNhEHbPxTLPNmAnAmKWayWHzwiopCkmSfj5tGRviBa2L1iQ4naX cHhs+JQ0CLFVHtlDoLcj/rUZzIstiQaY/26adxMu22Fh6clEAkpTCiozyHQ0Fxbl3PpG p8QA== X-Gm-Message-State: AOJu0Yz6EollRaJZs/WV4piD9+pFvmNaOJNX927aUsso2M83Pl0rgNoi 6ZfwHlNBhIs5Q9XG3L5kBlgvMgzmvDElFf9baKtt9FiZxf91v1EoLBO688a/m34J0xEI85/Wuiv DZSkDqfIuB/MhW+Dtmj2L281sIkzlu3bbdQ4= X-Gm-Gg: ASbGncsd78L4eSQs8E+JPVQJ0WHCDf0ICIVhAn8TCtEiTqALDcArqvydEHHmJDScSer 14W0Rzlqj2+2BRUFkrFGXUxEvir+8rFu3vnVcga7M2dz4cOurzoNPBYjp5+33gqZIl2rJQsIb1A z3XTqwJWd5TzxnPu8oXvcXla2t5Q9eNbyDJd+q X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGHT+IGy8/MrhLusPA2AZnfg7DjjagToY7Py4ceLdb90E9AetyKUB2pKkt3Zf3gkifMNw8NY7pq5YFgArTHq4F/Zynw= X-Received: by 2002:a17:906:c10d:b0:aba:246b:3954 with SMTP id a640c23a62f3a-ac3304139f6mr63855966b.47.1741916326486; Thu, 13 Mar 2025 18:38:46 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: In-Reply-To: From: "David Bray, PhD" Date: Thu, 13 Mar 2025 21:38:09 -0400 X-Gm-Features: AQ5f1JrJkloaxMS5zVJpssoBXTtx4BJ1pkwh9zz-6qPOxiDBAMBaMOO2YYUDrP4 Message-ID: To: =?UTF-8?Q?Network_Neutrality_is_back=21_Let=C2=B4s_make_the_technical_asp?= =?UTF-8?Q?ects_heard_this_time=21?= Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000de6a550630437ff6" Subject: Re: [NNagain] FCC - delete, delete, delete X-BeenThere: nnagain@lists.bufferbloat.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.20 Precedence: list List-Id: =?utf-8?q?Network_Neutrality_is_back!_Let=C2=B4s_make_the_technical_aspects_heard_this_time!?= List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 14 Mar 2025 01:38:49 -0000 --000000000000de6a550630437ff6 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Meanwhile there's Salt Typhoon, Volt Typhoon... also this: https://spectrum.ieee.org/iridium-satellite White Hat Hackers Expose Iridium Satellite Security Flaws Users' locations and texts can be intercepted, including DoD employees In a recent demonstration, German white hat hackers showed how to intercept text messages sent via the U.S. satellite communication system Iridium and locate users with an accuracy of about 4 kilometers. The twohackers, known publicly only under the nicknames Sec and Schneider, made the revelations during a presentation at the Chaos Communication Congress in late December in Hamburg, Germany . During the talk, they highlighted severe vulnerabilities in services that tens of thousands of users from the U.S. Department of Defense rely on. Although the DoD uses a secure gateway to route and encrypt its traffic, the hackers were able to see which devices were connecting via the DoD pathway. That allowed the duo to identify and locate DoD users with an accuracy of about 4 km using a home-assembled eavesdropping kit consisting of a commercially available Iridium antenna, a software-defined radio receiver and a basic computer, such as the Intel N100 mobile CPU or the Raspberry Pi mini-computer. =E2=80=9CWe see devices that register with the DoD service center and then = we can find their positions from these registrations,=E2=80=9D Sec said during the= talk. =E2=80=9CYou don=E2=80=99t have to see the communication from the actual ph= one to the network, you just see the network=E2=80=99s answer with the position, and y= ou then can map where all the registered devices are.=E2=80=9D Iridium=E2=80=99s Legacy Components Still Cause Problems The Iridium constellation , first deployed in the late 1990s, is made up of 66 satellites disbursed across six orbital planes roughly 870 km above Earth. The constellation, the first to have provided global commercial satellite communications services, supports satellite telephony and connects pagers, emergency beacons, and Internet of Things devices all over the world. Out of Iridium=E2=80=99s 2.3 million subscribers, 145,000 are U.S. government customers. Iridium receivers are also frequently used by vessels at sea and by aircraft pilots exchanging information with other airplanes and with ground control. =E2=80=9CBack then encryption wa= s not something on everyone=E2=80=99s mind,=E2=80=9D Sec said during the presenta= tion. =E2=80=9CAll the [first generation] Iridium data is unencrypted.=E2=80=9D In response to a request for comment, a spokesperson from Iridium says, =E2=80=9CThis is old news. The DoD and others encrypt their communications = over our network which address the issues this article raises. There is a reason the DoD continues to be such a big customer and we expect that to continue well into the future. We have always allowed others to encrypt their traffic over our network. Our commercial partners have been doing the same for decades, when and where the markets request it.=E2=80=9D Iridium replaced its first-generation fleet with more secure satellites (the second-generation NEXT constellation ) between 2017 and 2019. But according to satellite and telecommunications industry analyst Christian von der Ropp, many Iridium devices in use today, including civilian satellite phones , still rely on the first-generation Iridium radio protocol that has no encryption . =E2=80=9CThe regular satellite phones that they sell still operate under th= e old legacy protocol,=E2=80=9D says von der Ropp. =E2=80=9CIf you buy a brand-ne= w civilian Iridium phone, it still operates using the 30-year-old radio protocol, and it is subject to the same vulnerability. So, you can intercept everything. You can listen to the voice calls, you can read SMS , absolutely everything. Out of the box it=E2=80=99s a totally unsecure service.=E2=80=9D Von der Ropp estimates that tens or even hundreds of thousands of Iridium devices in use today rely on the old, unsecured radio protocol. Hackers Reveal Vulnerabilities in Iridium=E2=80=99s Systems While the DoD uses an extra layer of encryption to protect the content of its exchanges, other nations=E2=80=99 agencies appear to be less aware of t= he vulnerabilities. In perhaps the most jaw-dropping moment of the hacking demonstration, Sec revealed a text message exchanged between two employees of the German Foreign Office that he and Schneider were able to intercept. =E2=80=9CI need a good doctor in [Tel Aviv] who can also look at gunshot wo= unds. Can you send me a number ASAP,=E2=80=9D read the message sent by a worker a= t the Crisis Response Center of the German Foreign Office=E2=80=99s mission in Te= l Aviv. The hackers did not reveal when the exchange had taken place. Using software he and Schneider had created, Sec also showed a map of devices visible in a single moment to their eavesdropping gear located in Munich. Iridium devices as far as London, central Norway and Syria (more than 3,000 km away) could be seen. =E2=80=9CWith US $400 worth of equipment and freely available software, you= can start right away intercepting Iridium communications in an area with a diameter of hundreds, sometimes even thousands of kilometers,=E2=80=9D said= von der Ropp, who was present at the demonstration. =E2=80=9CThe Iridium signal is = divided into spot beams that are about 400 km wide. In principle, one should only be able to listen to the spot beam overhead. But the signal is so strong that you can also detect many of the surrounding spot beams, sometimes up to 2,000 km away.=E2=80=9D The DoD, von der Ropp said, is looking for alternatives to Iridium, including Starlink . Still, last year Iridium won a $94 million contract to provide communication services to the U.S. Space Force. Von der Ropp noted that few Iridium users seemed to be active in Ukraine , suggesting the local forces are potentially aware of Iridium=E2=80=99s shortcomings. The vulnerability of s= atellite systems and services to disruption and interference by bad actors has become a hot topic since Russia=E2=80=99s invasion of the country three yea= rs ago. The widespread cyberattack on the ground infrastructure of satellite communication provider Viasat crippled the Ukrainian forces=E2=80=99 access= to satcom services on the eve of the invasion. The incident, which according to analysts was planned by Russian state-backed hackers for months, revealed the weakness of Viasat=E2=80=99s cyber defenses. Since then, the number of cyberattacks on satcom providers has increased exponentially. Global navigation and positioning satellite systems such as GPS have also been put to the test. Signal jamming is now a regular occurrence even outside conflict zones and instances of sophisticated spoofing attacks , designed to confuse users and send them to wrong locations, are becoming increasingly common. *This story was updated on 14 February 2025 to add a statement from Iridium.* On Thu, Mar 13, 2025 at 2:36=E2=80=AFPM Robert McMahon via Nnagain < nnagain@lists.bufferbloat.net> wrote: > My opinions: > > There should be no more linux kernels in the customer premise with > Fi-Wi. 30M lines of code and 11,000 config options is a form of sw > bloat that's impossible to secure. Particularly since most noone is > getting paid for this work. > > Reducing the radio head/client (STA) density to near 1/1 and shrinking > the cell size will minimize the media access latency. Packet latency > can use non queue building techniques so there will be no substantial > packet queueing delays. All delay will be distance and speed of > photons related per physics & spacetime. > > Our issue isn't regulators - it's that white collar workers and our > leadership haven't engaged the blue collar workers, and we haven't > kept advancing our engineering. We need to teach fiber installer > businesses how to build these Fi-Wi networks so that our kids get life > support and productivity capable networks that can be depended upon. > > And everyone that adds value needs to be paid somehow. Best done > through markets. Fi-Wi creates high paying jobs in the trades for in > premise fiber installers. > > I think we lack vision and leadership, followed by execution. It's not > a cult thing like Musk's failed prophecies - it's the real deal that > impacts our lives. Low latency will become ubiquitous if we act to our > abilities. Waiting on regulators is like Waiting for Godot. > > Bob > > > On Thu, Mar 13, 2025 at 10:00=E2=80=AFAM Frantisek Borsik > wrote: > > > > Hey Bob, > > > > I don't think that improving latency is about mandating of a specific > algorithm - it's about an improvements to broadband definition. > > Broadband that servers the needs of us all today, goes beyond 100/20, > it's should include a low latency, low consistent jitter. > > Now, what are the right numbers, that's another discussion. But it's a > discussion we need to have. > > I would certainly let market to decide on the tools/algorithms that wil= l > achieve those numbers - be it a Quality of Experience middle box (like > LibreQoS, Preseem, Bequand/Cambium Networks QoE, Paraqum or Sandvine), L4= S > etc. > > > > As for the other issues that need some love - for example, making > vendors to update kernel and provide updates to routers they sold, that's= a > good thing. > > > > All the best, > > > > Frank > > > > Frantisek (Frank) Borsik > > > > > > > > https://www.linkedin.com/in/frantisekborsik > > > > Signal, Telegram, WhatsApp: +421919416714 > > > > iMessage, mobile: +420775230885 > > > > Skype: casioa5302ca > > > > frantisek.borsik@gmail.com > > > > > > > > On Thu, Mar 13, 2025 at 5:33=E2=80=AFPM Robert McMahon via Nnagain < > nnagain@lists.bufferbloat.net> wrote: > >> > >> > > >> > As for "what the FCC can do", "dissolve itself" comes to mind. AFAIK= , > it's been over a decade since they have done anything helpful or useful f= or > any American citizen who isn't the head of a major corporation. If you > delete the entire organization, there will be no one around to enforce > whatever regs are still on the books so who cares? ... and you'll save > another few 10's of millions of dollars annually which will fit nicely in > the pockets of the "good folks", aka FODT. =F0=9F=98=8A=F0=9F=98=8A=F0=9F= =98=8A > >> > > >> I worked with a CA state regulator in a tech support role prior to > >> so-called broadband (actually, internet access beyond dial-up MODEMs) > >> This was post 1996 telco act, just prior to the dot com bubble. The > >> lobbyists at the time disliked having 50 States regulating things. > >> They pushed made it so the 5 commissioners on the FCC became the > >> primary regulators. Many call this regulatory capture. > >> > >> Unfortunately, I don't think we can get rid of the FCC. Our utility > >> poles are mostly regulated by them as one example. > >> > >> I also don't think the FCC can mandage any specific AQM algorithm. > >> That's a long term disaster in the making for sure. Let network > >> engineers and the market battle that out. > >> > >> Bob > >> > >> PS. Good to hear from you RR - i hope all is well. I've got a Fi-Wi > >> project you may be interested in - not sure. > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Nnagain mailing list > >> Nnagain@lists.bufferbloat.net > >> https://lists.bufferbloat.net/listinfo/nnagain > _______________________________________________ > Nnagain mailing list > Nnagain@lists.bufferbloat.net > https://lists.bufferbloat.net/listinfo/nnagain > --000000000000de6a550630437ff6 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Meanwhile there's Salt Typhoon, Volt Typhoon... a= lso this:

<= div>

White Hat Hackers Expose Iridium Satellite Security Flaws

Users' locations and texts can b= e intercepted, including DoD employees

In a recent demonstration, German white hat hackers showed how to intercept text messages sent via the U.S. sat= ellite communication system Iridium and locat= e users with an accuracy of about 4 kilometers.

The twohackers, known publicly only under the nicknames Sec and Schneide= r, made the revelations during a presentation at the Chaos Communication Congress in late December in Ham= burg, Germany. During the talk, they highligh= ted severe vulnerabilities in services that tens of thousands of users from= the U.S. Department of Defense= rely on.

Although the DoD uses a secure gateway to route and encrypt its traffic, the=20 hackers were able to see which devices were connecting via the DoD=20 pathway. That allowed the duo to identify and locate DoD users with an=20 accuracy of about 4 km using a home-assembled eavesdropping kit=20 consisting of a commercially available Iridium antenna, a software-defined radio receiver and a basic compute= r, such as the Intel N100 mobile CPU or the Raspberry Pi mini-computer.

=E2=80= =9CWe see devices that register with the DoD service center and then we can=20 find their positions from these registrations,=E2=80=9D Sec said during the= =20 talk. =E2=80=9CYou don=E2=80=99t have to see the communication from the act= ual phone to=20 the network, you just see the network=E2=80=99s answer with the position, a= nd=20 you then can map where all the registered devices are.=E2=80=9D

Irid= ium=E2=80=99s Legacy Components Still Cause Problems

The Iridium constellation, first deployed in the late 1990s, is m= ade up of 66 satellites disbursed across six orbital planes roughly 870 km above Earth. The=20 constellation, the first to have provided global commercial satellite communications services, supports= satellite telephony and connects pagers, e= mergency beacons, and Internet of Thin= gs devices all over the world. Out of Iridium=E2=80=99s 2.3 million subscribe= rs,=20 145,000 are U.S. government customers. Iridium receivers are also=20 frequently used by vessels at sea and by aircraft pilots exchanging=20 information with other airplanes and with ground control.

=

=E2=80=9CBack then encryption was not something on everyone=E2=80=99s mind,=E2=80=9D Sec said during the= =20 presentation. =E2=80=9CAll the [first generation] Iridium data is unencrypt= ed.=E2=80=9D

In response to a request for comment, a spokesperson from Iridium says,=20 =E2=80=9CThis is old news. The DoD and others encrypt their communications = over=20 our network which address the issues this article raises. There is a=20 reason the DoD continues to be such a big customer and we expect that to continue well into the future. We have always allowed others to encrypt their traffic over our network. Our commercial partners have been doing the same for decades, when and where the markets request it.=E2=80=9D

<= p>Iridium replaced its first-generation fleet with more secure satellites (= the second-generation NEXT constellat= ion) between 2017 and 2019. But according to satellite and telecommunications industry analyst C= hristian von der Ropp, many Iridium devices in use today, including civilia= n satellite phones, still rely on th= e first-generation Iridium radio protocol that has no encryption.

=E2=80=9CThe regular satellite phones that they sell still operate under the old=20 legacy protocol,=E2=80=9D says von der Ropp. =E2=80=9CIf you buy a brand-ne= w civilian=20 Iridium phone, it still operates using the 30-year-old radio protocol,=20 and it is subject to the same vulnerability. So, you can intercept=20 everything. You can listen to the voice calls, you can read SMS, absolutely everything. Out of the box it=E2=80=99s a totall= y unsecure service.=E2=80=9D

Von der Ropp estimates that tens or even hundreds of thousands of Iridium=20 devices in use today rely on the old, unsecured radio protocol.

Hac= kers Reveal Vulnerabilities in Iridium=E2=80=99s Systems

While the DoD uses an extra layer of encryption to protect the content of its exchanges, other nations=E2=80=99 agencies appear to be less aware of the= =20 vulnerabilities. In perhaps the most jaw-dropping moment of the hacking=20 demonstration, Sec revealed a text message exchanged between two=20 employees of the German Foreign Office that he and Schneider were able=20 to intercept.

=E2=80=9CI need a good doctor in [Tel Aviv] who can als= o=20 look at gunshot wounds. Can you send me a number ASAP,=E2=80=9D read the me= ssage sent by a worker at the Crisis Response Center of the German Foreign=20 Office=E2=80=99s mission in Tel Aviv. The hackers did not reveal when the= =20 exchange had taken place.

Using software he and Schneider had=20 created, Sec also showed a map of devices visible in a single moment to=20 their eavesdropping gear located in Munich. Iridium devices as far as=20 London, central Norway and Syria (more than 3,000 km away) could be seen.

=E2=80=9CWith US $400 worth of equipment and freely available software, you can start right away intercepting Iridium communications in an area with a=20 diameter of hundreds, sometimes even thousands of kilometers,=E2=80=9D said= von=20 der Ropp, who was present at the demonstration. =E2=80=9CThe Iridium signal= is=20 divided into spot beams that are about 400 km wide. In principle, one=20 should only be able to listen to the spot beam overhead. But the signal=20 is so strong that you can also detect many of the surrounding spot=20 beams, sometimes up to 2,000 km away.=E2=80=9D

The DoD, von der Ropp = said, is looking for alternatives to Iridium, including Starlink. Still, last year Iridium won a $94 million contract t= o provide communication services to the U.S. Space Force.

Von der Ro= pp noted that few Iridium users seemed to be active in Ukraine, suggesting the local forces are potentially aware of Iridium=E2=80=99s=20 shortcomings. The vulnerability of satellite systems and services to=20 disruption and interference by bad actors has become a hot topic since=20 Russia=E2=80=99s invasion of the country three years ago. The widespread=20 cyberattack on the ground infrastructure of satellite communication=20 provider Viasat crippled the Ukrainian forces=E2=80=99 access to satcom ser= vices on the eve of the invasion. The incident, which according to analysts=20 was planned by Russian state-backed hackers for months, revealed the=20 weakness of Viasat=E2=80=99s cyber defenses.

Since then, the number = of cyberattacks on satcom providers has = increased exponentially. Global navigation and positioning satellite system= s such as GPS have also been put to the test. Signal jamming is now a regular occurrence= even outside conflict zones and instances of sophisticated spoofing attacks, designed to confuse users and = send them to wrong locations, are becoming increasingly common.

T= his story was updated on 14 February 2025 to add a statement from Iridium.<= /em>



On Thu, Mar 13, 2025 at 2:36=E2=80=AFPM Rob= ert McMahon via Nnagain <nnagain@lists.bufferbloat.net> wrote:
My opinions:

There should be no more linux kernels in the customer premise with
Fi-Wi. 30M lines of code and 11,000 config options is a form of sw
bloat that's impossible to secure. Particularly since most noone is
getting paid for this work.

Reducing the radio head/client (STA) density to near 1/1 and shrinking
the cell size will minimize the media access latency. Packet latency
can use non queue building techniques so there will be no substantial
packet queueing delays. All delay will be distance and speed of
photons related per physics & spacetime.

Our issue isn't regulators - it's that white collar workers and our=
leadership haven't engaged the blue collar workers, and we haven't<= br> kept advancing our engineering. We need to teach fiber installer
businesses how to build these Fi-Wi networks so that our kids get life
support and productivity capable networks that can be depended upon.

And everyone that adds value needs to be paid somehow. Best done
through markets. Fi-Wi creates high paying jobs in the trades for in
premise fiber installers.

I think we lack vision and leadership, followed by execution. It's not<= br> a cult thing like Musk's failed prophecies - it's the real deal tha= t
impacts our lives. Low latency will become ubiquitous if we act to our
abilities. Waiting on regulators is like Waiting for Godot.

Bob


On Thu, Mar 13, 2025 at 10:00=E2=80=AFAM Frantisek Borsik
<frantis= ek.borsik@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Hey Bob,
>
> I don't think that improving latency is about mandating of a speci= fic algorithm - it's about an improvements to broadband definition.
> Broadband that servers the needs of us all today, goes beyond 100/20, = it's should include a low latency, low consistent jitter.
> Now, what are the right numbers, that's another discussion. But it= 's a discussion we need to have.
> I would certainly let market to decide on the tools/algorithms that wi= ll achieve those numbers - be it a Quality of Experience middle box (like L= ibreQoS, Preseem, Bequand/Cambium Networks QoE, Paraqum or Sandvine), L4S e= tc.
>
> As for the other issues that need some love - for example, making vend= ors to update kernel and provide updates to routers they sold, that's a= good thing.
>
> All the best,
>
> Frank
>
> Frantisek (Frank) Borsik
>
>
>
> https://www.linkedin.com/in/frantisekborsik
>
> Signal, Telegram, WhatsApp: +421919416714
>
> iMessage, mobile: +420775230885
>
> Skype: casioa5302ca
>
> franti= sek.borsik@gmail.com
>
>
>
> On Thu, Mar 13, 2025 at 5:33=E2=80=AFPM Robert McMahon via Nnagain <= ;nnagain= @lists.bufferbloat.net> wrote:
>>
>> >
>> > As for "what the FCC can do", "dissolve itself= " comes to mind. AFAIK, it's been over a decade since they have do= ne anything helpful or useful for any American citizen who isn't the he= ad of a major corporation. If you delete the entire organization, there wil= l be no one around to enforce whatever regs are still on the books so who c= ares? ... and you'll save another few 10's of millions of dollars a= nnually which will fit nicely in the pockets of the "good folks",= aka FODT. =F0=9F=98=8A=F0=9F=98=8A=F0=9F=98=8A
>> >
>> I worked with a CA state regulator in a tech support role prior to=
>> so-called broadband (actually, internet access beyond dial-up MODE= Ms)
>> This was post 1996 telco act, just prior to the dot com bubble. Th= e
>> lobbyists at the time disliked having 50 States regulating things.=
>> They pushed made it so the 5 commissioners on the FCC became the >> primary regulators. Many call this regulatory capture.
>>
>> Unfortunately, I don't think we can get rid of the FCC. Our ut= ility
>> poles are mostly regulated by them as one example.
>>
>> I also don't think the FCC can mandage any specific AQM algori= thm.
>> That's a long term disaster in the making for sure. Let networ= k
>> engineers and the market battle that out.
>>
>> Bob
>>
>> PS. Good to hear from you RR - i hope all is well. I've got a = Fi-Wi
>> project you may be interested in - not sure.
>> _______________________________________________
>> Nnagain mailing list
>> Nnagain@lists.bufferbloat.net
>> https://lists.bufferbloat.net/listinfo/nnagai= n
_______________________________________________
Nnagain mailing list
Nnagain@= lists.bufferbloat.net
https://lists.bufferbloat.net/listinfo/nnagain
--000000000000de6a550630437ff6--