From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp86.iad3a.emailsrvr.com (smtp86.iad3a.emailsrvr.com [173.203.187.86]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.bufferbloat.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1D9073B29E for ; Sat, 5 Mar 2022 19:39:41 -0500 (EST) Received: from app50.wa-webapps.iad3a (relay-webapps.rsapps.net [172.27.255.140]) by smtp27.relay.iad3a.emailsrvr.com (SMTP Server) with ESMTP id 928D7210F6 for ; Sat, 5 Mar 2022 19:39:40 -0500 (EST) Received: from deepplum.com (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by app50.wa-webapps.iad3a (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7D4F8600BC for ; Sat, 5 Mar 2022 19:39:40 -0500 (EST) Received: by apps.rackspace.com (Authenticated sender: dpreed@deepplum.com, from: dpreed@deepplum.com) with HTTP; Sat, 5 Mar 2022 19:39:40 -0500 (EST) X-Auth-ID: dpreed@deepplum.com Date: Sat, 5 Mar 2022 19:39:40 -0500 (EST) From: "David P. Reed" To: starlink@lists.bufferbloat.net MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_20220305193940000000_71679" Importance: Normal X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-Type: html In-Reply-To: References: X-Client-IP: 209.6.168.128 Message-ID: <1646527180.51036626@apps.rackspace.com> X-Mailer: webmail/19.0.13-RC X-Classification-ID: 31749944-2727-4257-8751-15289c1b76e1-1-1 Subject: [Starlink] Starlink deplyment in Ukraine X-BeenThere: starlink@lists.bufferbloat.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.20 Precedence: list List-Id: "Starlink has bufferbloat. Bad." List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 06 Mar 2022 00:39:41 -0000 ------=_20220305193940000000_71679 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable =0ATHis is a good discussion, and I hope for more.=0A =0A1. I'm really curi= ous how well Starlink's bent-pipe architecture actually works in a context = like Ukraine where fiber and copper infrastructure are vulnerable and less = redundant than in a place like the UK. I'm not so worried about the dishy's= working or being targeted. They can be moved and disguised. What is not be= ing discussed here (or anywhere) is where the ground stations that the traf= fic must *all* traverse are, and the fact that they are Single Points of Fa= ilure, and must be nailed down in places which are close enough to the dish= y they serve, and also fiber-backhauled into the Internet. This is a seriou= s technical issue that interests me, mostly because Starlink doesn't publis= h its technical specs.=0A =0ASo these ground stations for Ukrainian coverag= e are where? Ukraine is a BIG area. It certainly won't be covered by one gr= ound station. And it certainly can't be just an 18-wheeler with a huge ante= nna on top, because it needs to be connected to a point-of-presence with lo= ts of capacity - the sum of all the dishy's peak loads.=0A =0AI'm suspectin= g that some ground station is actually in Ukraine itself, but putting it in= Kyiv just makes it a tempting target (like a power station or water utilit= y), and it is much more vulnerable and visible to Russian troops in the are= a.=0A =0ANow Poland and Moldova are potential sites that might cover part o= f Ukraine, but certainly not that far into the country.=0A =0A2. I hope tha= t Starlink isn't just doing this to get Musk in the news, but actually want= s to facilitate ongoing connectivity to the Internet, independent of "sides= ". (as others here have noted, communications control is a very imprecise i= nstrument when it is a tool of aggression - "virtue signalling" by a billio= naire who has been knowmid 1990's trying to bring Internet connectivity to = poor people in Jamaica and poro people in the West Bank each partly caused = the deaths of a few people we thought we were only helping. But that's a lo= ng story in each context).=0A =0AMore seriously, if Musk is not covering mu= ch of Ukraine at all, and just shipping dishy's there, that's good, but I h= ope he doesn't try to take credit for more than Starlink actually can do. I= mean it would also be nice if Mikrotik shipped in meshable WiFi, but that'= s of limited utility, even if the most clever hackers tried to create an ou= tdoor mesh of them. The coverage would be very limited, and you still need = a non-WiFi path to the Internet to communicate over wide areas.=0A =0AI'm s= till appalled by Musk's actions when the Thai boys needed to be rescued fro= m a cave. [ https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-50667553 ]( https://ww= w.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-50667553 ) . I hope he learned something whe= n he was sued.=0A =0A =0A =0A ------=_20220305193940000000_71679 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

THis is a good discuss= ion, and I hope for more.

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1. I'm really curious how well Starlink's bent-pipe architectu= re actually works in a context like Ukraine where fiber and copper infrastr= ucture are vulnerable and less redundant than in a place like the UK. I'm n= ot so worried about the dishy's working or being targeted. They can be move= d and disguised. What is not being discussed here (or anywhere) is where th= e ground stations that the traffic must *all* traverse are, and the fa= ct that they are Single Points of Failure, and must be nailed down in place= s which are close enough to the dishy they serve, and also fiber-backhauled= into the Internet. This is a serious technical issue that interests me, mo= stly because Starlink doesn't publish its technical specs.

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So these ground stations for= Ukrainian coverage are where? Ukraine is a BIG area. It certainly won't be= covered by one ground station. And it certainly can't be just an 18-wheele= r with a huge antenna on top, because it needs to be connected to a point-o= f-presence with lots of capacity - the sum of all the dishy's peak loads.=0A

 

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I'm suspecting = that some ground station is actually in Ukraine itself, but putting it in K= yiv just makes it a tempting target (like a power station or water utility)= , and it is much more vulnerable and visible to Russian troops in the area.=

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Now Poland an= d Moldova are potential sites that might cover part of Ukraine, but certain= ly not that far into the country.

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=0A<= p style=3D"margin:0;padding:0;font-family: arial; font-size: 10pt; overflow= -wrap: break-word;">2. I hope that Starlink isn't just doing this to get Mu= sk in the news, but actually wants to facilitate ongoing connectivity to th= e Internet, independent of "sides". (as others here have noted, communicati= ons control is a very imprecise instrument when it is a tool of aggression = - "virtue signalling" by a billionaire who has been knowmid 1990's trying t= o bring Internet connectivity to poor people in Jamaica and poro people in = the West Bank each partly caused the deaths of a few people we thought we w= ere only helping. But that's a long story in each context).

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More seriously, if Musk is n= ot covering much of Ukraine at all, and just shipping dishy's there, that's= good, but I hope he doesn't try to take credit for more than Starlink actu= ally can do. I mean it would also be nice if Mikrotik shipped in meshable W= iFi, but that's of limited utility, even if the most clever hackers tried t= o create an outdoor mesh of them. The coverage would be very limited, and y= ou still need a non-WiFi path to the Internet to communicate over wide area= s.

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I'm still a= ppalled by Musk's actions when the Thai boys needed to be rescued from a ca= ve. http= s://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-50667553 . I hope he learned = something when he was sued.

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