Re: [Starlink] spacex & ukraine

[Larry Press <lpress@csudh.edu>]

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> The balance, as David mentions, is on the value of the target vs. the effort required to strike.

The value of allowing government and resistance leaders and journalists to communicate with each other and the outside world seems quite high, making the terminals attractive targets for the Russians.

The cost of locating and striking a target also seems high -- Ukraine is large and the terminals are portable. SpaceX is testing roaming without re-registration in California/Nevada (https://circleid.com/posts/20220225-spacex-is-testing-starlink-roaming). If SpaceX is listening -- consider enabling roaming in by the users in Ukraine.

Larry

________________________________
From: Starlink <starlink-bounces@lists.bufferbloat.net> on behalf of Mike Puchol <mike@starlink.sx>
Sent: Wednesday, March 2, 2022 1:06 AM
To: Dave Taht <dave.taht@gmail.com>; David Lang <david@lang.hm>
Cc: starlink@lists.bufferbloat.net <starlink@lists.bufferbloat.net>
Subject: Re: [Starlink] spacex & ukraine

Thank you Dave, the honor is mine to share a mailing list with so many people who know way more than I do, about any subject I could point my finger at, so I really appreciate it.

On the subject at hand, ELINT/SIGINT and traffic analysis has evolved massively over the years. In the mid-90s, the Chechen president was killed by Russia with a missile strike, based on his satcom phone signals, which included decoding the speech and matching to ensure they were hitting the right target.

The balance, as David mentions, is on the value of the target vs. the effort required to strike. It is relatively easy to monitor cellular networks, decrypt the traffic, and triangulate to almost automatically target & strike. The same happens with VSAT, which operates against a fixed satellite, so an aircraft high enough will be in the path between a large portion of the ground and the satellite.

With Starlink, the challenge is two-fold. You must be able to detect & locate the 4.5º wide uplink beam from a terminal, which constantly moves - this can be done by measuring just the RF levels and using an ESA to find the source. You must also ensure that the user of the terminal is a target valuable enough to justify a strike, which would be a lot harder, as you need to keep a good enough SNR to demodulate, then you’d need to decrypt. Doing this in real time on an airborne platform is quite a challenge.

Bottom line: unless Russia goes all-out against anyone using any form of radio comms (phones, VSAT, satcom, Starlink, etc.) and they just blindly strike any source of RF, a Starlink user has a good chance to avoid being targeted by just using the terminal. Different case is if terminals get used by the military, and Russia then assumes Starlink = military target. We’re far from any clear scenario, so we need to wait & see.

A couple of weeks ago I sent a Ku band LNB to Oleg, tuned to the Starlink uplink band (12.75 - 14.5 GHz), but it arrived a couple of days before the invasion began, so he didn’t get a chance to do any analysis on the TX side of the terminal.

Best,

Mike
On Mar 1, 2022, 22:15 +0300, David Lang <david@lang.hm>, wrote:
a couple thoughts on anti-radiation missiles being fired at starlink dishes

1. the dishes are fairly low power (100w or less) and rather directional, so
they aren't great targets.

2. dishes cost FAR less than the missiles that would be fired at them, and are
being produced at a much higher rate (although there are probably more missles
in the Russian inventory than spare dishes in SpaceX inventory)

direction finding teams with boots on the ground could be more of a threat, but
the higher frequency signals are blocked fairly easily (which is why the dishes
need a clear view of the sky). It takes a fair amount of training to be good at
direction finding on weak and intermittent signals.

David Lang

On Tue, 1 Mar 2022, Dave Taht wrote:

Date: Tue, 1 Mar 2022 13:55:47 -0500
From: Dave Taht <dave.taht@gmail.com>
To: starlink@lists.bufferbloat.net
Subject: [Starlink] spacex & ukraine

It is an ongoing honor to have mike puchol sharing his insights with
us, also, on this list.

https://spacenews.com/spacex-heeds-ukraines-starlink-sos/<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://spacenews.com/spacex-heeds-ukraines-starlink-sos/__;!!P7nkOOY!uT2pzIfUcFbj7Vv0Bb9RBU2KwIN5DrfrZHS-tHLcaxzdteVwgm5SzgXoiFK1cNklRuLosonTTiDHWk8$>

--
I tried to build a better future, a few times:
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Dave Täht CEO, TekLibre, LLC
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