From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail-qt1-x835.google.com (mail-qt1-x835.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::835]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.bufferbloat.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3B2613CB37 for ; Wed, 3 Apr 2024 11:57:19 -0400 (EDT) Received: by mail-qt1-x835.google.com with SMTP id d75a77b69052e-432fe06d76fso17285341cf.3 for ; Wed, 03 Apr 2024 08:57:19 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20230601; t=1712159838; x=1712764638; darn=lists.bufferbloat.net; h=to:subject:message-id:date:from:mime-version:from:to:cc:subject :date:message-id:reply-to; bh=6DRnsbHwmssdo72r0YXayuJ42Qr05M++w8By/3bpN8E=; b=DhYUa6fQCF0xlExHYEfTe7noTb3ky86luKN6RVVToO/PD9+QWzG0g4dY1LfyqRYLu0 3a/4LmnqxNQyLSgWOWchZrd+Qoc63lz2btRzrM1a3C1CXazaYFcUfKQoc9tyBN9sPNPK Dhb9Ah9XpMuqI92YSqBeNhr4WjdQdgrgjkAn389AZEvbdYp+JQxujdg7K9YOJTke8nOF iGvP2LfwFgMufxDAq8cAXAZxsJ1IZH3bdkXlW1EYv91LmgT6PKfJO63EebOrTZzYSPRg egjbVinVDN1efqizIp0KYWIyy2bUUgKllkwJMOoeDku4m4x6bOS293lPv/0AtpzQRF20 Q86Q== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20230601; t=1712159838; x=1712764638; h=to:subject:message-id:date:from:mime-version:x-gm-message-state :from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=6DRnsbHwmssdo72r0YXayuJ42Qr05M++w8By/3bpN8E=; b=imqRJeEfKpGFHIJYMqf+LhqwHdlWHZISQ1u3eJYwnAjE7p/ELd4BLCv006ivFDp6Wp OBjNbmFC69CZgGXP8dUl3vH9SLDXZGLpj6v7P69qnXG0D6OjpzgJZFLUFHSlCMcmDKPx NVZYzguLONrH/RtDoTL50FsShUgRPUvSIAa8IXYqsPpOKShzFLBdzjgbBQ0xOAlBIvYS N2swhX4MvRrlSbPRyW+M2MbFlrk01IdnUFc40aitcMwvz+eKuwbeAp4/GwLtveKkNo9Q aHLxFepGuXVD4JcA+Gwy3h0xlLvE2vH6dASwJ/kg/Z0uT/0jGXxeVKUrJhCwYKnGMJnl Mn0A== X-Gm-Message-State: AOJu0YzL3oPFtRWtIQvQ7+kmC7MznblitU5ONLwtTejeC+S8/BQqXtPr WCYJ4jfsH3ke/+Dv8AEObWlw/zuC7raZ7X4qh0D+iYjCUO1EhWB+UWU0zDUh4YSniMfQS1eoQlI 897iE4OEw/dvvRDLyj04T5IHRuyLjbkWTp4c= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGHT+IENiRBdL677oDuQdN91rVnPT5T0uSU/W+o2ZAjzzUcZGRuuBOM3V+8ufpuWHPfONN56/+D/XbQVxvdb1jxwicI= X-Received: by 2002:a05:622a:590:b0:431:59e9:4a5a with SMTP id c16-20020a05622a059000b0043159e94a5amr18708753qtb.68.1712159838189; Wed, 03 Apr 2024 08:57:18 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Frantisek Borsik Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2024 17:56:41 +0200 Message-ID: To: Dave Taht via Starlink Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000f4438a0615334664" Subject: [Starlink] Elon Musk's Starlink Terminals Are Falling Into the Wrong Hands? [from RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest Monday 1 April 2024 Volume 34 : Issue 12] X-BeenThere: starlink@lists.bufferbloat.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.20 Precedence: list List-Id: "Starlink has bufferbloat. Bad." List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 03 Apr 2024 15:57:19 -0000 --000000000000f4438a0615334664 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" *Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2024 14:34:52 +0000*From: Henry Baker < hbaker1@pipeline.com> Subject: Elon Musk's Starlink Terminals Are Falling Into the Wrong Hands? For many years in the 1970's, a (physical) bulletin board at MIT's AI Lab had an article posted with the headline 'ARPAnet accused of transmitting data'. I'm sure that there must have been many articles in the 1920's with the headline 'Henry Ford's Automobiles are Falling into Criminal Hands', and many articles in the 1700's with the headline 'Johannes Gutenberg's Printing Presses are falling into Papist Hands'. https://www.freep.com/story/money/cars/ford/2019/02/09/bonnie-clyde-chestnut-barrow-ford/2812888002/ "I have drove Fords exclusively when I could get away with one." signed "Yours truly Clyde Champion Barrow." [of 'Bonnie & Clyde' fame] Criminals breath air, drink water, eat food, use the telephone, drive the roads, etc., -- in short -- they utilize everything that non-criminals do in order to commit their crimes. But restricting access to air, water, food, etc., hurts everyone a lot more than it hurts criminals -- we cut off our nose to spite our face. Once again, be very, very, very careful what you wish for when you start to regulate technology that everyone wants (and needs) to use. https://www.yahoo.com/news/elon-musk-starlink-terminals-falling-210028713.html Elon Musk's Starlink Terminals Are Falling Into the Wrong Hands Bruce Einhorn, Loni Prinsloo, Marissa Newman and Simon Marks Mon, March 25, 2024 at 2:00 PM PDT *(Bloomberg) *-- SpaceX's Starlink touts its high-speed internet as ``available almost anywhere on Earth.'' In the real world, its reach extends to countries where Elon Musk's satellite-enabled service has no agreement to operate, including territories ruled by repressive regimes. A Bloomberg News investigation identified wide-spanning examples of Starlink kits being traded and activated illegally. How they are smuggled and the sheer availability of Starlink on the black market suggests that its misuse is a systemic global problem, raising questions about the company control of a system with clear national security dimensions. In Yemen, which is in the throes of a decade-long civil war, a government official conceded that Starlink is in widespread use. Many people are prepared to defy competing warring factions, including Houthi rebels, to secure terminals for business and personal communications, and evade the slow, often censored internet service that's currently available. Or take Sudan, where a year-long civil war has led to accusations of genocide, crimes against humanity and millions of people fleeing their homes. With the regular internet down for months, soldiers of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces are among those using the system for their logistics, according to Western diplomats. ``It is deeply concerning because it's unregulated and headed by a private company, Emma Shortis, a senior researcher in international and security affairs at the Australia Institute, an independent think tank in Canberra, said of the Starlink system. ``There's no accountability on who has access to it and how it's being used.'' Starlink delivers broadband Internet beamed down from a network of roughly 5,500 satellites that SpaceX started deploying in 2019. With some 2.6 million customers already, Starlink has the potential to become a major moneymaker for SpaceX, a company that began as Musk's way to fulfill his dream of exploring Mars and has now become the most important private-sector contractor to the US government's space program and a dominant force in national security. Musk, until recently the world's richest person, has said there will be a cap to how much money SpaceX's launch services business will make, while Starlink could eventually reach revenue of $30 billion a year. Starlink plans to launch tens of thousands of additional satellites to connect places that are too remote for ground-based broadband or that have been cut off by natural disasters or conflict. But given the security concerns around a private American company controlling Internet service, SpaceX first needs to strike agreements with governments in each territory. Where there are none, people are ``proceeding to use Starlink without the proper coverage'' that is quite illegal and of course should not be allowed, but it's difficult to control and manage,'' said Manuel Ntumba, an Africa geospatial, governance and risk expert based in New York. In central Asia, where Starlink deals are rare, a government crackdown on illicit terminals in Kazakhstan this year has barely made a dent on its use. All it did was lead to higher prices on the black market, according to a trader who imports the gear and who didn't want to speak publicly for fear of retribution. Prior to the government intervention, customers were able to buy the company's equipment and have it shipped via the local postal service, the trader said. SpaceX didn't respond when asked to comment on a written list of questions submitted on Thursday. ``If SpaceX obtains knowledge that a Starlink terminal is being used by a sanctioned or unauthorized party, we investigate the claim and take actions to deactivate the terminal if confirmed,'' the company said in a post on X in February. The growing black market for Starlink has emerged in regions with patchy connectivity, where the allure of high speed, dependable Internet in an easy-to-use package is strong for businesses and consumers alike. In many ways, it's Starlink's effectiveness as a communications tool that has made it such a sensitive matter. The US military is a customer: The Air Force has been testing terminals in the Arctic, calling them *reliable and high-performance*. Those same properties made it vital to Ukraine's military in its defense against invading Russian forces. SpaceX provided the technology to Kyiv in the early days of Russia's invasion, and Starlink has since become crucial to the Ukrainian communications infrastructure. The US Departcment of Defense later struck a deal with Starlink to supply Ukraine with equipment, the terms of which were not made public. Then in February of this year, Ukraine said that Russia was deploying Starlink in its own war efforts, while unverified posts on X, Musk's social network, appeared to show Russian soldiers unpacking kits. Two House Democrats wrote a letter to SpaceX President Gwynne Shotwell pressing her on Ukraine's claims. ``To the best of our knowledge, no Starlinks have been sold directly or indirectly to Russia,'' Musk wrote on X. Itquo;s the uncertainty about where the satellite dishes are landing that as security officials around the world concerned. Starlink kits are being sold for use in Venezuela, where individuals and entities have been subject to US sanctions for almost a decade, most recently under President Nicolas Maduro's authoritarian rule. A map of coverage areas on Starlink's website shows the South American nation blacked out. Yet social media ads promote package deals for Starlink equipment, which is widely available and admired for its reliability and portability in a country of isolated cattle ranches and gold mines. SpaceX should be able to prevent Russian use of Starlink in occupied Ukraine, since ``basically every single transmitter can be identified,'' said Candace Johnson, director at NorthStar Earth & Space Inc., a Montreal company that in January successfully launched four satellites -- on a rocket from SpaceX competitor Rocket Lab USA Inc. -- to identify and track objects in space. ``There needs to be more accountability: to your country, to your company, to your shareholders, to your stakeholders,'' said Johnson, who is also a partner with Seraphim Capital, a venture-capital firm that invests in space startups. In North Africa, Starlink's use in Sudan shows how terminals arrive in a country subject to international sanctions. There has been no Internet in Sudan since early February. Both the Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces have blamed each other for cutting the service while the CEO of Zain Sudan, a mobile operator, said his company's engineers had been prevented from reaching parts of the country to reconnect the network due to insecurity and a lack of fuel. To bypass the blackout, members of the RSF and local business owners have smuggled Starlink devices into Sudan's Darfur region using an organized network that registered the units in Dubai before transporting them into Uganda by airplane and then by road to Sudan via South Sudan, according to interviews with Western diplomats and business owners using the devices. Gold miners in remote areas along the borders of South Sudan and the Central African Republic were provided with Starlink services even prior to the war by traders working in South Darfur's Nyala City. Starlink says on its website that a ``service date is unknown at this time'' for Sudan. Haroun Mohamed, a trader in Nyala who transports goods across the border to Chad and South Sudan, said the use of Starlink by RSF soldiers and civilians was widespread. ``Ever since the eruption of war in Darfur, a lot of people are bringing in Starlink devices and use it for business. People are paying between $2 or $3 per hour, so it's very good business.'' In South Africa, where Musk was born, the government hasn't yet approved Starlink's application to operate. But that hasn't prevented a flourishing trade in terminals there. Facebook groups feature providers that offer to buy and activate the kits in Mozambique, where it is licensed, and then deliver them over the border to South African customers. There were enough users of the service in the country as of Nov. 28 that the regulator felt the need to issue a statement reminding people that Starlink has no license for South Africa. Unlawful use could result in fines of as much as 5 million rand ($265,000), or 10% of annual turnover. Regulators in other countries in Africa have issued similar warnings. Ghana's National Communications Authority in December released a statement demanding that anyone involved in selling or operating Starlink services in the country ``cease and desist immediately.'' In Zimbabwe, authorities threatened raids in response to online advertising for Starlink equipment, H-Metro newspaper reported in January. Prices for Starlink gear on the black market ranged from $700 to $2,000, according to local technology blog Techzim. Government officials in Ghana and Zimbabwe have recently said they hope to allow licensed service. Countries have different reasons for declining to cooperate with Starlink, including stipulations that it have a local partner and concerns around data use. Starlink service is currently available --legally -- in eight countries in sub-Saharan Africa, and the US company has big plans to build its user base. It is working with local marketing partners such as Jumia Technologies AG, an e-commerce company backed by Pernod Ricard SA that has an agreement to sell Starlink equipment for residential use in Nigeria and Kenya. There has been significant demand, with the first shipment to Nigeria selling out in a few hours, according to Chief Commercial Officer Hisham El Gabry. ``Jumia is aware that there are some unofficial distributors of these kits,'' El Gabry said in an interview. While the number of devices is not yet at an alarming level, ``it is a point of discussion between us and Starlink that this needs to be brought under control,'' he said. Jumia verifies customers, and cancels orders if they are going to traders or unverified sources, according to El Gabry. While ``that device could eventually end up with bad actors,'' Starlink can monitor where these devices are connecting from. ``If they pick up it ``connecting from a particular militant group for instance, they can enforce that control,'' he said. One Facebook group of people complaining they've`been cut off suggests that Starlink has recently de-activated some of the equipment smuggled into South Africa. Still, social media groups point to a workaround, with terminals re-registered in a country like Malawi and reactivated. Customers can then make use of Starlink's roaming services, with a subscription paid through the website. The company offers a global roaming service with a monthly charge of $200. Customers in South Africa can expect to pay about 12,000 rand ($630) for a kit. In Venezuela, customers similarly get around the ban by paying for the global service plan using an international credit card, according to people familiar with the market, who said its use is now ``normalized.'' President Joe Biden's administration could tighten the export controls that apply to Starlink to keep them out of the hands of American adversaries, according to a former US government official. A security consultant who provides training to companies on the restrictions said the real key is trying to geolocate kits when they are turned on and blocking the ones that are in violation of US export controls. That would require the company to cooperate, the person said, asking not to be named discussing commercially sensitive matters of national security. A State Department spokesperson said that satellite constellations like Starlink are a key tool for providing connectivity and bridging digital divides. ``We encourage companies to take appropriate measures to seek licenses for operating in nations around the world,'' they said. Meanwhile, SpaceX is providing assurance to some countries that it will work with them to keep its Starlink services out of certain areas. SpaceX has reassured Israel that it can geolocate and turn off individual terminals when it detects illegal use, according to an Israeli government official. In Yemen, meanwhile, Starlink kits are openly for sale on social media, bought in countries such as Singapore or Malaysia, then activated on roaming. Customers pay via bank transfers in other countries or at the port of arrival. Prices are higher in Houthi-controlled areas, said one seller who asked not be named for safety reasons. That's because telecoms are controlled by the Houthis, who profit from the revenues, and have warned of severe actions against those caught using Starlink. Facebook and WhatsApp groups offer the equipment regardless mdash; along with tips on how to conceal the dish. --With assistance from Fabiola Zerpa, Daniel Flatley, Mohammed Alamin, Mohammed Hatem, Andreina Itriago Acosta, Nariman Gizitdinov, Ray Ndlovu, Eric Johnson and Jake Rudnitsky. The ACM RISKS Forum is a MODERATED digest. Its Usenet manifestation is comp.risks, the feed for which is donated by panix.com as of June 2011. => SUBSCRIPTIONS: The mailman Web interface can be used directly to subscribe and unsubscribe: http://mls.csl.sri.com/mailman/listinfo/risks => SUBMISSIONS: to risks@CSL.sri.com with meaningful SUBJECT: line that includes the string `notsp'. Otherwise your message may not be read. *** This attention-string has never changed, but might if spammers use it. => SPAM challenge-responses will not be honored. Instead, use an alternative address from which you never send mail where the address becomes public! => The complete INFO file (submissions, default disclaimers, archive sites, copyright policy, etc.) has moved to the ftp.sri.com site: . *** Contributors are assumed to have read the full info file for guidelines! => OFFICIAL ARCHIVES: http://www.risks.org takes you to Lindsay Marshall's delightfully searchable html archive at newcastle: http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/VL.IS --> VoLume, ISsue. Also, ftp://ftp.sri.com/risks for the current volume/previous directories or ftp://ftp.sri.com/VL/risks-VL.IS for previous VoLume If none of those work for you, the most recent issue is always at http://www.csl.sri.com/users/risko/risks.txt, and index at /risks-34.00 ALTERNATIVE ARCHIVES: http://seclists.org/risks/ (only since mid-2001) *** NOTE: If a cited URL fails, we do not try to update them. Try browsing on the keywords in the subject line or cited article leads. Apologies for what Office365 and SafeLinks may have done to URLs. ==> Special Offer to Join ACM for readers of the ACM RISKS Forum: ------------------------------ End of RISKS-FORUM Digest 34.12 ************************ All the best, Frank Frantisek (Frank) Borsik https://www.linkedin.com/in/frantisekborsik Signal, Telegram, WhatsApp: +421919416714 iMessage, mobile: +420775230885 Skype: casioa5302ca frantisek.borsik@gmail.com --000000000000f4438a0615334664 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable


Date: Tue, 26 Mar 20= 24 14:34:52 +0000
From: Henry Baker <hbaker1@pipeline.com>
Subject: Elon= Musk's Starlink Terminals Are Falling Into the Wrong Hands?

For= many years in the 1970's, a (physical) bulletin board at MIT's AI = Lab had
an article posted with the headline 'ARPAnet accused of tran= smitting data'.

I'm sure that there must have been many arti= cles in the 1920's with the
headline 'Henry Ford's Automobil= es are Falling into Criminal Hands', and
many articles in the 1700&#= 39;s with the headline 'Johannes Gutenberg's Printing
Presses ar= e falling into Papist Hands'.

https://www.freep.com/story/money/= cars/ford/2019/02/09/bonnie-clyde-chestnut-barrow-ford/2812888002/
<= br>"I have drove Fords exclusively when I could get away with one.&quo= t;=C2=A0 signed
=C2=A0"Yours truly Clyde Champion Barrow." [of= 'Bonnie & Clyde' fame]

Criminals breath air, drink wate= r, eat food, use the telephone, drive the
roads, etc., -- in short -- th= ey utilize everything that non-criminals do in
order to commit their cri= mes. But restricting access to air, water, food,
etc., hurts everyone a = lot more than it hurts criminals -- we cut off our
nose to spite our fac= e.

Once again, be very, very, very careful what you wish for when yo= u start to
regulate technology that everyone wants (and needs) to use.
https://www.yaho= o.com/news/elon-musk-starlink-terminals-falling-210028713.html

E= lon Musk's Starlink Terminals Are Falling Into the Wrong Hands

B= ruce Einhorn, Loni Prinsloo, Marissa Newman and Simon Marks
Mon, March 2= 5, 2024 at 2:00 PM PDT

(Bloomberg) -- SpaceX's Starlink t= outs its high-speed internet as
``available almost anywhere on Earth.= 9;'=C2=A0 In the real world, its reach
extends to countries where El= on Musk's satellite-enabled service has no
agreement to operate, inc= luding territories ruled by repressive regimes.=C2=A0 A
Bloomberg News i= nvestigation identified wide-spanning examples of Starlink
kits being tr= aded and activated illegally. How they are smuggled and the
sheer availa= bility of Starlink on the black market suggests that its misuse
is a sys= temic global problem, raising questions about the company control of
a s= ystem with clear national security dimensions.=C2=A0 In Yemen, which is in = the
throes of a decade-long civil war, a government official conc= eded that
Starlink is in widespread use. Many people are prepared to def= y competing
warring factions, including Houthi rebels, to secure termina= ls for business
and personal communications, and evade the slow, often c= ensored internet
service that's currently available.=C2=A0 Or take S= udan, where a year-long civil
war has led to accusations of genocide, cr= imes against humanity and millions
of people fleeing their homes. With t= he regular internet down for months,
soldiers of the paramilitary Rapid = Support Forces are among those using the
system for their logistics, acc= ording to Western diplomats.=C2=A0 ``It is deeply
concerning because it&= #39;s unregulated and headed by a private company, Emma
Shortis, a senio= r researcher in international and security affairs at the
Australia Inst= itute, an independent think tank in Canberra, said of the
Starlink syste= m. ``There's no accountability on who has access to it and how
it= 9;s being used.'' Starlink delivers broadband Internet beamed down = from a
network of roughly 5,500 satellites that SpaceX started deploying= in
2019. With some 2.6 million customers already, Starlink has the pote= ntial to
become a major moneymaker for SpaceX, a company that began as M= usk's way to
fulfill his dream of exploring Mars and has now become = the most important
private-sector contractor to the US government's = space program and a
dominant force in national security.=C2=A0 Musk, unt= il recently the world's
richest person, has said there will be a cap= to how much money SpaceX's
launch services business will make, whil= e Starlink could eventually reach
revenue of $30 billion a year. Starlin= k plans to launch tens of thousands of
additional satellites to connect = places that are too remote for ground-based
broadband or that have been = cut off by natural disasters or conflict.=C2=A0 But
given the security c= oncerns around a private American company controlling
Internet service, = SpaceX first needs to strike agreements with governments
in each territo= ry. Where there are none, people are ``proceeding to use
Starlink withou= t the proper coverage'' that is quite illegal and of course
shou= ld not be allowed, but it's difficult to control and manage,'' = said
Manuel Ntumba, an Africa geospatial, governance and risk expert bas= ed in New
York.=C2=A0 In central Asia, where Starlink deals are rare, a = government
crackdown on illicit terminals in Kazakhstan this year has ba= rely made a
dent on its use. All it did was lead to higher prices on the= black market,
according to a trader who imports the gear and who didn&#= 39;t want to speak
publicly for fear of retribution. Prior to the govern= ment intervention,
customers were able to buy the company's equipmen= t and have it shipped via
the local postal service, the trader said.=C2= =A0 SpaceX didn't respond when asked
to comment on a written list of= questions submitted on Thursday.=C2=A0 ``If
SpaceX obtains knowledge th= at a Starlink terminal is being used by a
sanctioned or unauthorized par= ty, we investigate the claim and take actions
to deactivate the terminal= if confirmed,'' the company said in a post on X
in February.=C2= =A0 The growing black market for Starlink has emerged in regions
with pa= tchy connectivity, where the allure of high speed, dependable
Internet i= n an easy-to-use package is strong for businesses and consumers
alike.= =C2=A0 In many ways, it's Starlink's effectiveness as a communicati= ons tool
that has made it such a sensitive matter. The US military is a = customer: The
Air Force has been testing terminals in the Arctic, callin= g them *reliable
and high-performance*. Those same properties made it vi= tal to Ukraine's
military in its defense against invading Russian fo= rces. SpaceX provided the
technology to Kyiv in the early days of Russia= 's invasion, and Starlink has
since become crucial to the Ukrainian = communications infrastructure. The US
Departcment of Defense later struc= k a deal with Starlink to supply Ukraine
with equipment, the terms of wh= ich were not made public.=C2=A0 Then in February
of this year, Ukraine s= aid that Russia was deploying Starlink in its own war
efforts, while unv= erified posts on X, Musk's social network, appeared to
show Russian = soldiers unpacking kits. Two House Democrats wrote a letter to
SpaceX Pr= esident Gwynne Shotwell pressing her on Ukraine's claims.=C2=A0 ``To th= e
best of our knowledge, no Starlinks have been sold directly or indirec= tly to
Russia,'' Musk wrote on X.=C2=A0 Itquo;s the uncertainty = about where the
satellite dishes are landing that as security officials = around the world
concerned.=C2=A0 Starlink kits are being sold for use i= n Venezuela, where
individuals and entities have been subject to US sanc= tions for almost a
decade, most recently under President Nicolas Maduro&= #39;s authoritarian rule. A
map of coverage areas on Starlink's webs= ite shows the South American nation
blacked out. Yet social media ads pr= omote package deals for Starlink
equipment, which is widely available an= d admired for its reliability and
portability in a country of isolated c= attle ranches and gold mines.=C2=A0 SpaceX
should be able to prevent Rus= sian use of Starlink in occupied Ukraine, since
``basically every single= transmitter can be identified,'' said Candace
Johnson, director= at NorthStar Earth & Space Inc., a Montreal company that
in January= successfully launched four satellites -- on a rocket from SpaceX
compet= itor Rocket Lab USA Inc. -- to identify and track objects in space.
``Th= ere needs to be more accountability: to your country, to your company,
t= o your shareholders, to your stakeholders,'' said Johnson, who is a= lso a
partner with Seraphim Capital, a venture-capital firm that invests= in space
startups.=C2=A0 In North Africa, Starlink's use in Sudan s= hows how terminals
arrive in a country subject to international sanction= s.=C2=A0 There has been no
Internet in Sudan since early February. Both = the Sudanese Armed Forces and
Rapid Support Forces have blamed each othe= r for cutting the service while
the CEO of Zain Sudan, a mobile operator= , said his company's engineers had
been prevented from reaching part= s of the country to reconnect the network
due to insecurity and a lack o= f fuel.=C2=A0 To bypass the blackout, members of
the RSF and local busin= ess owners have smuggled Starlink devices into
Sudan's Darfur region= using an organized network that registered the units
in Dubai before tr= ansporting them into Uganda by airplane and then by road
to Sudan via So= uth Sudan, according to interviews with Western diplomats and
business o= wners using the devices.

Gold miners in remote areas along the borde= rs of South Sudan and the Central
African Republic were provided with St= arlink services even prior to the war
by traders working in South Darfur= 's Nyala City. Starlink says on its
website that a ``service date is= unknown at this time'' for Sudan.

Haroun Mohamed, a trader = in Nyala who transports goods across the border to
Chad and South Sudan,= said the use of Starlink by RSF soldiers and civilians
was widespread. = ``Ever since the eruption of war in Darfur, a lot of people
are bringing= in Starlink devices and use it for business.=C2=A0 People are paying
be= tween $2 or $3 per hour, so it's very good business.''

I= n South Africa, where Musk was born, the government hasn't yet approved=
Starlink's application to operate. But that hasn't prevented a = flourishing
trade in terminals there. Facebook groups feature providers = that offer to
buy and activate the kits in Mozambique, where it is licen= sed, and then
deliver them over the border to South African customers.
There were enough users of the service in the country as of Nov. 28 t= hat the
regulator felt the need to issue a statement reminding people th= at Starlink
has no license for South Africa. Unlawful use could result i= n fines of as
much as 5 million rand ($265,000), or 10% of annual turnov= er.

Regulators in other countries in Africa have issued similar
w= arnings. Ghana's National Communications Authority in December released= a
statement demanding that anyone involved in selling or operating Star= link
services in the country ``cease and desist immediately.''
In Zimbabwe, authorities threatened raids in response to online adver= tising
for Starlink equipment, H-Metro newspaper reported in January. Pr= ices for
Starlink gear on the black market ranged from $700 to $2,000, a= ccording to
local technology blog Techzim. Government officials in Ghana= and Zimbabwe
have recently said they hope to allow licensed service.
Countries have different reasons for declining to cooperate with Starl= ink,
including stipulations that it have a local partner and concerns ar= ound data
use.

Starlink service is currently available --legally = -- in eight countries in
sub-Saharan Africa, and the US company has big = plans to build its user
base. It is working with local marketing partner= s such as Jumia Technologies
AG, an e-commerce company backed by Pernod = Ricard SA that has an agreement
to sell Starlink equipment for residenti= al use in Nigeria and Kenya. There
has been significant demand, with the= first shipment to Nigeria selling out
in a few hours, according to Chie= f Commercial Officer Hisham El Gabry.

``Jumia is aware that there ar= e some unofficial distributors of these
kits,'' El Gabry said in= an interview. While the number of devices is not
yet at an alarming lev= el, ``it is a point of discussion between us and
Starlink that this need= s to be brought under control,'' he said.=C2=A0 Jumia
verifies c= ustomers, and cancels orders if they are going to traders or
unverified = sources, according to El Gabry. While ``that device could
eventually end= up with bad actors,'' Starlink can monitor where these
devices = are connecting from.=C2=A0 ``If they pick up it ``connecting from a
part= icular militant group for instance, they can enforce that control,''= ; he
said.

One Facebook group of people complaining they've`b= een cut off suggests that
Starlink has recently de-activated some of the= equipment smuggled into South
Africa. Still, social media groups point = to a workaround, with terminals
re-registered in a country like Malawi a= nd reactivated. Customers can then
make use of Starlink's roaming se= rvices, with a subscription paid through
the website.=C2=A0 The company = offers a global roaming service with a monthly
charge of $200. Customers= in South Africa can expect to pay about 12,000
rand ($630) for a kit.
In Venezuela, customers similarly get around the ban by paying for th= e
global service plan using an international credit card, according to p= eople
familiar with the market, who said its use is now ``normalized.= 9;'

President Joe Biden's administration could tighten the e= xport controls that
apply to Starlink to keep them out of the hands of A= merican adversaries,
according to a former US government official. A sec= urity consultant who
provides training to companies on the restrictions = said the real key is
trying to geolocate kits when they are turned on an= d blocking the ones that
are in violation of US export controls. That wo= uld require the company to
cooperate, the person said, asking not to be = named discussing commercially
sensitive matters of national security.
A State Department spokesperson said that satellite constellations lik= e
Starlink are a key tool for providing connectivity and bridging digita= l
divides. ``We encourage companies to take appropriate measures to seek=
licenses for operating in nations around the world,'' they said= .

Meanwhile, SpaceX is providing assurance to some countries that it= will work
with them to keep its Starlink services out of certain areas.= =C2=A0 SpaceX has
reassured Israel that it can geolocate and turn off in= dividual terminals
when it detects illegal use, according to an Israeli = government official.
In Yemen, meanwhile, Starlink kits are openly for s= ale on social media,
bought in countries such as Singapore or Malaysia, = then activated on
roaming. Customers pay via bank transfers in other cou= ntries or at the port
of arrival. Prices are higher in Houthi-controlled= areas, said one seller
who asked not be named for safety reasons. That&= #39;s because telecoms are
controlled by the Houthis, who profit from th= e revenues, and have warned of
severe actions against those caught using= Starlink.=C2=A0 Facebook and WhatsApp
groups offer the equipment regard= less mdash; along with tips on how to
conceal the dish.

--With as= sistance from Fabiola Zerpa, Daniel Flatley, Mohammed Alamin,
Mohammed H= atem, Andreina Itriago Acosta, Nariman Gizitdinov, Ray Ndlovu,
Eric John= son and Jake Rudnitsky.





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End of RISKS-FORUM Digest 34.12
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All the best,

Frank

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