[Cerowrt-devel] Full blown DNSSEC by default?
dave.taht at gmail.com
Sun Apr 13 12:40:55 EDT 2014
On Sun, Apr 13, 2014 at 9:16 AM, <dpreed at reed.com> wrote:
> I'd be for A. Or C with a very, very strong warning that would encourage
> users to pressure their broken upstream. Users in China will never not have
> a broken upstream, of course, but they know that already... :-)
I'd be very much for A except that I'd like somehow a failure to resolve
due to a dnssec problem to return a pointer to something, somehow
that informs the user as to what went wrong and what to do about it.
> Similarly, I hope we don't have Heartbleed in our SSL.
All versions of cerowrt prior to 3.10.36-3 potentially had heartbleed
in the https admin interface, and also possibly hostapd (though I
don't know how to exploit it). The optional wpa_supplicant, openvpn,
strongswan, authsae packages also were affected and a few others I
More scarily - from a large deployment perspective, things like the
radsec radius backend also use TLS security to carry authentication
info back to a radius server.
All of openwrt, dd-wrt, etc from Attitude Adjustment to trunk to about
12 hours after the disclosure were vulnerable. Patches went into the
relevant repositories but it's going to be very hard to push updates
out to the field, since no update mechanism exists for most embedded
Boingo has sent out a mail to all customers saying they were not
affected, but I do worry a lot about the overall security of
enterprise wifi and 802.1x ethernet networks in general.
> Maybe we should put
> a probe in Cero's SSL that tests clients to see if they have Heartbleed
> fixed on their side, and warns them.
I'd like more probes and defenses in general, notably things that detect
dns amplification attempts and send them somewhere to be collected,
some sort of universal moon worm attempt detector/reporter, and the
equivalent of a rbl database for attacks and potential attackers.
> Any DNS provider that doesn't do DNSSEC should be deprecated strongly (I'm
> pretty sure OpenDNS cannot do so, since it deliberately fakes its lookups,
> redirecting to "man in the middle" sites that it runs).
Concur. On the one hand I was happy with the idea of dnscrypt, but not
happy that the backend couldn't do dnssec right.
> On Sunday, April 13, 2014 12:26am, "Dave Taht" <dave.taht at gmail.com> said:
>> I am delighted that we have the capability now to do dnssec.
>> I am not surprised that various domain name holders are doing it
>> wrong, nor that some ISPs and registrars don't support doing it
>> either. We are first past the post here, and kind of have to expect
>> some bugs...
>> but is the overall sense here:
>> A) we should do full dnssec by default, and encourage users to use
>> open dns resolvers like google dns that support it when their ISPs
>> B) or should we fall back to the previous partial dnssec
>> implementation that didn't break as hard, and encourage folk to turn
>> it up full blast if supported correctly by the upstream ISP?
>> C) or come up with a way of detecting a broken upstream and falling
>> back to a public open resolver?
>> Is there a "D"?
>> Dave Täht
>> Cerowrt-devel mailing list
>> Cerowrt-devel at lists.bufferbloat.net
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